THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

A LIVELY discussion is proceeding in *The Christian News-Letter* and elsewhere about our English system of education. It is agreed that, while the Churches have been actively concerned about some of the consequences of the introduction and development of universal education, yet they have culpably neglected basic questions upon which attention ought to have been fixed. In the early years of this century fierce interdenominational battles raged over the kind of religious instruction that was to be given in the State-provided schools. In retrospect, few of the combatants can be disposed to congratulate themselves upon the result of those battles. As regards this particular question, however, there has recently come about on paper, and to some extent in practice, a remarkable advance. We refer to the Agreed Syllabuses which are being adopted by local educational authorities. Agreement does not yet extend to all questions of Church order and government, and this fact limits both what can be included in an Agreed Syllabus and the basis on which there can be co-operation between the several denominations. But anyone who still has misgivings as to the quality and range of the religious instruction that *may* be given in State-provided schools is advised to study the revised edition (1939) of *The Cambridgeshire Syllabus of Religious Teaching for Schools*. Nevertheless it would be foolish to suppose that instruction of this quality is, in fact, being generally given, or that under present conditions there is any possibility of its being generally given. For effective religious instruction postulates teachers who are qualified to give it. From this point of view the future training of teachers is a matter of crucial importance. As high a standard of qualification should be required in those who give religious instruction as in the case of any other subject. That seems obvious; yet the stalwart combatants of yesterday neglected to insist on this condition or to make constructive provision for its realization.

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It would, however, be a great mistake to isolate one question, and to suggest that, if that were dealt with, all would be well. It is the natural tendency of those who clearly see one particular need and the remedy for it to focus their thought and their action there and to ignore the wider perspective. It is the old difficulty of the wood and the trees. The question of religious instruction is not the wood, but a tree or a section of the wood. If what is taught in the half-hour of religious instruction is unrelated to what is taught outside that period, if, in fact, the educational system as a whole reflects a world-view that is incongruous with the Christian world-view, if it is calculated to prepare children for a way of life that the Christian must regard as contrary to nature and as recalcitrant to grace, the insertion into this system of one alien element cannot be expected to produce beneficent results. This is not to argue for the introduction of pious reflections into the arithmetic lesson; it is to assert that the Christian may not stop short of demanding that the whole system shall be controlled and integrated by a purpose which is neither adverse nor indifferent to, but positively in accord with, the biblical doctrine of the nature of man. In other words, the basic question about education is the question of the faith which is to be the guide and criterion of our national life in all its aspects. At present we are more sure that we do not want this faith to be a British version of Nazism or Bolshevism than what we do intend it to be. It is not enough to say that we want to " defend freedom." Freedom for what ? Freedom to live what kind of a life, what kind of a communal life ? Is not the difference between " the World of God " and " the World of Wells " apropos ?

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While, therefore, Christians should be eagerly concerned with such questions as the raising of the school age, the widening of the field of educational opportunity, the abolition of irrational privilege, and the provision of an educational discipline on a national scale for all adolescents, they must be specially concerned to insist that we may not burke a decision as to the faith of the whole community. For, as Mr T. S. Eliot has pointed out in the course of the discussion to which we have alluded, " Whatever ideals a society maintains (and it is not necessarily conscious of

what its real ideals are) will insensibly influence its whole system of education, will affect the way in which it teaches, the way in which it acquires, the way in which it uses, the most apparently remote or specialized disciplines " (*C. N.-L. Supplement*, No. 20). In progressive circles there is much talk of the inevitability of social change; little good and much harm can be expected from changes in the machinery of our society unless they are determined with reference to definite ideals and values. Mr Eliot suggests that " the values which we most ignore, the recognition of which we most seldom find in writings on education, are those of Wisdom and Holiness," and he adds that there are innumerable people to-day to whom the terms would be meaningless even if they were defined.

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In the public schools changes are already imminent, occasioned by the pressure of economic circumstances. The public schools are commonly regarded as strongholds of conservative prejudice and of class privilege. While there is much to justify this view, it is also true that many of those who are responsible for their administration are alive to the need for responding magnanimously to the necessity for change. While the public schools educate only a small proportion of our society, yet their importance is out of all proportion to their size, and may remain so. On the one hand, they have the opportunity of continuing to be the training-ground of those who are to play a leading part in the various departments of the national life. And on the other hand, their freedom from State control allows them to modify their aims and to make constructive experiments in advance of what central or local bureaucracies may be willing to authorize. But the measure of freedom which they will be able to retain is likely to depend on their readiness forthwith to become public in fact as well as in name. Professor Tawney has said that " a public school is not a school that is easily accessible to the public, but a school that the great majority of the public are precluded from entering " (*Equality*, p. 96). It is announced that headmasters will be meeting during this month to consider a proposal that a Royal Commission should be set up to examine the future of these schools—a step which would make possible the initiation of big changes. It is difficult to see what reasonable objections there could be to

throwing open forthwith twenty-five per cent. of the places in public schools to free competition, and indeed to regarding this as a step preliminary to the complete abolition of financial privilege as the qualification for admission to them. At the same time we hope that occupation with this particular change will not divert attention from the more fundamental question of the aim of our whole educational system, and its relation to the faith that should permeate the life of the nation.

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The universities also must not be exempted from criticism. The ancient universities can no longer be said to stand for any positive *Weltanschauung*; the modern universities never even professed to do so. Official indifference to the theological or metaphysical beliefs of both dons and undergraduates is the order of the day. It would be unrealistic to suggest, and under existing conditions probably wrong to desire, that a world-view consonant with Christian dogma should be officially inculcated by all universities. But an attempt might at least be made, by Christians if by no one else, to show that indifference is both foolish and fatal. Neutrality is a temporary phase. The Church may deserve to have been deprived of its ancient privileges, but as things are the last state threatens to be much worse than the first. The skill and wit of Mgr Knox's book, *Let Dons Delight*, have been much admired and enjoyed. It is time to lay to heart the moral which it implied.

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We reported last month that the magazine *Œcumenica* had suspended publication. We are glad to learn that in its place a sixteen-page *Bulletin* is to be issued. This will be sent *gratis* to all who have been subscribers to *Œcumenica*.

John Neville Figgis, Prophet, 1866-1919

THE present writer is certainly not the only one of those undergraduates of 1908 on whom the sight of the author of *The Divine Right of Kings* and *From Gerson to Grotius*, preaching in Great St Mary's the adventure of Christianity and the Way of the Cross, made a lasting impression. John Neville Figgis was Hulsean Lecturer for the academic year 1908-9. He chose as his subject *The Gospel and Human Needs*. In short sentences incisively spoken, the pupil of Maitland told us, not of the achievements of historical criticism nor of ways and means of accommodating the Gospel to the current philosophy, but of man's desperate need and God's redemption, of the necessity of belief in miracles, of the romance of religion, of the Incarnation and the Sacraments.

Who could forget the sudden beginning? "*Blessed be the Lord God of Israel, for He hath visited and redeemed His people.* Has He? That is the question we are all asking." And to some who have lived to see the breaking up of a civilization which had progressively lost its Christian character, the echo of his prophetic voice must come with an added poignancy. For he told us that the new age, "imperious and resistless," was seeking for that sense of freedom and power, of victory and joy, which Christians find only in One who said: "*I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.*" He saw that the battle of Christianity was a struggle for one form of *religion* against others, and not against materialists or agnostics. For him the figure of Nietzsche was a portent, "a strange comet in the serene heaven of philosophy," the likeness of Antichrist. The "new apostle of the will to power poured scorn on Christian morality, and in the place of humility set up a saturnalia of selfish pride." But how more than fair he was to Nietzsche, partly because he was attracted by this tragic, terrifying figure, in which the divine image was marred by pride and madness; but mostly because he had learned by the ascetic discipline of the historian to weigh with care and responsibility each one of his judgments. So in *The Will to Freedom*, a series of lectures given in 1915, he could praise Nietzsche for his rejection of a facile optimism and for his recognition of the "tragedy of things." But he pointed unerringly to the danger of a "philosophy of pride" which, in politics, led inevitably to

the worship of power and the desire for world-dominion. But this was written in the second year of the Great War. Earlier than that, in 1913, Figgis had said: " The forces of civilization are imposing; but apart from Christ they are visibly dissolving. Its tall towers are shaking, and the splendid spires of the edifices of the western world are crumbling. Catastrophe is threatening. We can almost hear the thunder of the avalanche of war—war on a scale unknown. Hardly does the world even look stable any longer. It is not like the forties of Victorian complacency, but looks all tottering—tottering."

Figgis saw with piercing clearness that the hatred of the world was to be concentrated again on a Christian " remnant," that open enmity was to be the mark of the future; that man's freedom was denied and with this denial went all sense of man's dignity and value; and that the claim of the civil power to illimitable authority threatened the very existence of those societies within the State which give variety and meaning to the life of the individual. " The battle of freedom in this century is the battle of small societies to maintain their inherent life as against the all-devouring Leviathan of the whole—a Leviathan not less but more dangerous if its form be democratic."

" The Christian Church," he said, " is more and more becoming the sole strength of those who believe in man, just as it is the home of all vital belief in God, as Love." And again, he showed that where the love of God was set aside, the love of man went with it.

" One after another, empires have risen and decayed through this very cause, that they treated the vast mass as mere tools. . . . This is a lie. Treat human beings as machines as much as you will, the fact remains that they are incurably personal. Ultimately this truth is destructive of the proudest tyranny, though it may last a thousand years." The Gospel, he said, " appeals to each man as such, and assures him of his eternal worth. He is worth the life and death of Jesus Christ." " It was the Christian Church, as even Nietzsche admitted, that first saw the worth of each man as an end, not a means." And again, he loved to speak of " the undying romance of the individual soul."

In his study of history, and especially in his study of the history of political theory, on which his academic reputation chiefly rested, he had been impressed with the enormous

importance of the problem of freedom in the face of the omnipotent secular state. In the preface to his Birkbeck Lectures, *From Gerson to Grotius*, he had said: " Increasing reading in this subject has had one main result—it has confirmed the writer in his opinion of the absolute solidarity of the controversies of our own day with those forgotten conflicts which form the argument of these lectures. The debt of the modern world to the medieval grows greater as one contemplates it, and the wisdom of the later age less conspicuous." In *Churches in the Modern State* (1913) he could speak with even more freedom, and say that the claim to State absolutism was one which no religious society can admit without being false to the very idea of its existence, or placing the Divine Law at the mercy of political convenience. From Gierke and Maitland he had learned to defend the inherent rights of the societies, including religious bodies, which exist, not as creatures of the State, but with an underived life of their own, within the larger collectivity we call the State. Events in France and portents elsewhere had made the danger clear. But how could lawyers and politicians be brought to understand that the Austinian theory was an abstract theory and a denial of the facts of life? Yet to-day we are bitterly conscious of the perils which Figgis foresaw as he traced the history of absolutism in Church as well as State (" that passion for State absolutism which is the child of the Renaissance and Reform, and the grandchild of the Pagan state ") and brooded on the portents which disturbed few political philosophers besides himself.

What disturbed him as well was the prevailing complacency among Christians in the face of social injustice. " The state of our cities, the lives of the vast masses among the workers are a disgrace to any civilization, and in so far as this civilization calls itself Christian, it is a lie."

" It is a mockery and a lie to talk of the Christian Church as a brotherhood, or to speak of the equality of men before God, if in our whole mental outlook we treat the great mass of mankind as mere hewers of wood and drawers of water." On Ash Wednesday, 1912, he preached at Leeds from Isaiah: " Is not this the fast that I have chosen? to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke? Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to

thy house? when thou seest the naked, that thou cover him: and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh?" He wished to see the Church take up again her prophetic mission, and Christians cease to be completely identified with the world, in the sharing of its values, in its love of money, in the honour it pays to wealth, in its selfish spending. "What proportion of professing Christians have at this moment any notion that they ought to train their families so as to spend less on clothes or amusements or luxury than those who are not Christians? . . . Many of our social problems would settle themselves if the great bulk of communicants ceased to want more than is good for them." And again, with characteristic pungency: "So long as boys and girls are encouraged by example to think of amusement as their main object, they cannot profess any real allegiance to Christ, unless they are hopelessly muddle-headed."

Preaching from the text "Here have we no continuing city," he laid down the true motive for Christian social action. It is not the happiness but the character of men that is the true aim of all social improvement, and the development of character is the vainest of achievements if the life of the race is merely an evanescent episode. "The heavenly life alone lends reality to all schemes of earthly amelioration, the life beyond that alone gives value to this, the eternal, the immortal, the invisible, that alone makes it worth while to lift mankind from the mire of selfishness and corruption." "Only as we live within the circle of the Ascended Glory shall we be really able for work here."

And here we reach what was for him the core of the Christian gospel, the "otherworldliness, which is the very essence of the Christian life." We seek "a better country, that is, a heavenly." Poetry, art, learning, every side of human achievement touched and attracted him. He deplored the divorce between the Church and intellectual activities, believing that "Christianity is the sanction of Humanism in its best sense, and the Church is the true home of the soul and the body." In the great thirteenth century, religion and culture ministered to the whole life of the people, with a "broadly human appeal"; but now they are the affairs of the few and are treated as apart from the main stream of a civilization "presented to us in all its beauty by the factory and the cinema."

In what manner could the restoration of a truer culture be conceived? It could only be on the basis of human society recognized as primarily and properly a fellowship. "The great need of our industrial cities is not more money, but a higher life for all; not better houses, but better communal buildings; a first-rate theatre for every city, with a municipal orchestra; for more universities, not only for the few but for all." Figgis was emphasizing the social nature of any true culture, and he proceeded to show that the issue was between a spiritual and a non-spiritual culture. The world must be shown "(1) that we mean what we say when we talk of human life as being a fellowship, and (2) that on the intellectual side the highest and deepest culture is that of the Christian. . . . We have to show that we, because we are Christians, have deeper social sympathies and more acute intellectual interests than those who are not."

Christianity, therefore, does not turn its back on the God-given proper activities of men. It brings to all these activities the principle of the Cross. "The Christian law is that we must lose ourselves to save ourselves—that pain, risk, drudgery, all forms of daily dying, are essential for any mastery, whether bodily, mental, social or spiritual."

This Christian asceticism must be the principle of any Christian culture, and such a culture is not possible apart from a supernatural ideal. God is the true home of the soul. Not this life, but the life of the world to come is the end for which we were made, and any humanism which sets up man and his achievements in the place meant for God is doomed.

Here is the great gulf between the Church and the world. Figgis almost exulted in the fact that the world was at last finding out quite clearly the true character of Christianity, and was beginning to show an active hatred. It thrilled him to remember that St John had said, "Marvel not, my brethren, if the world hate you," and he preached from this text on St Alban's day. On another occasion, preaching in St Paul's, he told his congregation: "There is something wrong about your religion when the world does not think it silly." And again he said: "God may want us, but men don't, that is certain. They don't want our gospel, they dislike our ideals, they despise our credentials, they laugh at us as the bearers of any message. They do. There is no doubt about it. And I think they

will do so more, not less, than they have done. . . . Open enmity has at last, thank God, taken the place of veiled dislike, and scorn of indifference."

Now Figgis was never tired of putting it that " the claim of the Gospel is not so much to solve problems as to come near to human lives." Christianity is essentially concrete; God has not spoken to us in an abstract system, in a philosophy, but in His Son. " It is to the crib and the baby that men look, to the boy in the Temple, to the strange preacher of goodness, the friend of Lazarus, to the sufferer of Gethsemane, the confronter of Pilate and Herod, and, above all, to the ' strange Man on the Cross.' " This is the meaning of the universality of the appeal of Christ, a universality which is continued in the Church, of which He is the risen and glorified Head. The Church is free to all; she is the spiritual democracy of mankind. " The Eucharist is shared by all; and the gift is the same to saint and sinner, to priest and layman, to an archbishop and to an artisan."

He would emphasize the audacity of the assumptions on which the creed of the Church rested, the assertion of the supernatural character of the events out of which the Church had issued, and of their witness to God's freedom and His catastrophic intervention in history; and, at the same time, what he called the " congruity " of Christian truth with life, as it is lived, and its unique power to satisfy the needs of men. For as he put it shortly, " the essence of the faith is to be spiritual, personal, supernatural, and it may not be reconciled with any rationally designed scheme of the universe." " The Gospel is as universal as life, and no less mysterious," and he was quick to point out that the facts of the Gospel and its dogmas are quite natural to the young. Had he not found this out in his catechisms at Marnhull ? And he added: " Dogma, it is said, should not be taught to children; but it would be true to say that it is the only thing you can teach them." The Christian God is not the god of the philosophers, involved in or himself a part of the world-process. " *He is the living God.*" Figgis was never tired of insisting that in this fact lies the real meaning of the miraculous, the real denial of the naturalistic view of the universe, a view, he said, which is belied by all life. A living God is a God who acts in His world, in the Incarnation, in the sacramental presence, in acts of " creative love." Miracles are the expression

of His freedom, of the truth that He is above and not merely within the order of nature.

Only so can we believe in repentance or forgiveness, or in the mystery of redemption. For Christianity is above all things a religion of redemption, and redemption is meaningless unless you believe in freedom, both of God and of men. "*Our soul is escaped like a bird out of the snare of the fowler : the snare is broken, and we are delivered.* It is true. We have escaped, and we are never more going to put our feet in the trap." Scattered about his writings are other self-revealing touches. "We, who are unwilling to bow the knee to the new Baal [represented by the then current theological 'liberalism'], are not ignorant of his attractions, and some of us have passed through the fire." But I have no space to quote the passage which follows. It will be found on p. 294 of the volume called *The Fellowship of the Mystery*, and it shows the peril of an intellectualism which "seems to cut away everything not by argument, but by detaching faith from all living interest."

As an historian, he knew and could weigh the methods of his adversaries. In his Hulsean Lectures he told us: "To others faith is the bright serenity of unclouded vision; to me it is the angel of an agony, the boon of daily and hourly conflict." But, as the Dean of Winchester said in a recent article in THEOLOGY, he presented to us a living religion "at once vital and critical, orthodox and up to date, Catholic and non-Roman, Anglican to the core."

My chief aim in compiling this summary of the main ideas which guided the thought of John Neville Figgis is to show the prophetic accuracy with which he read the signs of the times and disentangled from the confusion of the contemporary world just those issues which were to face the following generation. It cannot be claimed that he was a great historian, as Acton or Creighton or Maitland was great. Neither had he a remarkable gift of expression. He wrote in short unrhythmic sentences, and there is sometimes a poverty in his choice of words. The charm was all in the speaking voice, heard at its best when, from the pulpit, he was declaiming Matthew Arnold, Francis Thompson, or, with real *abandon*, Swinburne.

The study of the Conciliar Movement in the fifteenth century had made a great impression on him. In the arguments put forward by the supporters of the Councils, he saw the justification for the position of the Church of

England. It was to the immense drudgery of his study of published texts, ranging from ancient to medieval and modern times, a study which he never divorced from their contemporary history, that he owed his power of penetrating to the heart of the real problems that faced the present and the immediate future. This is the secret of his prophetic gift. The problems he raised are precisely the problems that are facing the Church in this shattered world, and they are the problems that Christian thinkers are discussing with all the urgency which comes from the sense of imminent catastrophe.

F. J. E. Raby.

The Future of Bible Reading

Even the young Hebraist, whose daily business is with the grammar, history and religion of the Old Testament, must from time to time feel a certain urge to raise the problems involved in the religious use of the Bible to-day. Some four hundred years ago, when the Great Bible had just been placed in our parish churches, the long tradition of English Bible reading began. The Great Bible remains accordingly a landmark in the history of the liberty of the human spirit. It is indeed usual, and very probably not unfair, to claim that the English Bible has exercised more influence on English-speaking countries than any one other work. But much water, whether sprung from religious, political or social fountains, has flowed into the Dead Sea in the last four hundred years. The Bible, though still, as it is not infrequently claimed, a best seller, has clearly less hold on the general mind than in other ages it possessed. To all outward seeming it has shared the fate of all other old infallibilities, yielding place to new oracles which have displayed a stronger appeal to the emotions and prejudices of the modern age. In so far as Bible readers have indeed turned the Bible into an oracle the change is to be welcomed, for as such the Bible could never have an authority which for Christians could rightly be called religious, simply because the aim of Christianity is the salvation of individuals, which plainly cannot be achieved except by persuasion and conviction, which have nothing truly in common with the language of oracles. To treat the Bible as a manual of

geology, or to dispute whether the serpent indeed spoke, is no true method of showing the Bible proper respect, still less is it to make any religious use of it. The Bible cannot edify unless it be read critically. But to this topic we will return. The real danger, I would urge, to the future of Bible reading is no matter of stones and serpents, but the much more serious growth of a climate of opinion which does not allow that the essential spirit of biblical religion has any place in the modern world. This trend has been the subject (though with a somewhat different emphasis) of recent discussion in this journal, and I would wish to add this article to those which the discussion has already evoked. In the turmoil of our time, in which the savagery of war has once again eclipsed the gaiety of nations, there is good reason to fear even for the survival of Christianity. We still have, it may be urged, our national church, but we cannot say how long it will last, for it shows singularly little power to reform itself, and indeed it might be cold comfort to be told that the survival of Christianity had no surer ground of hope. But the only outward and visible common factor between Christians of all ecclesiastical allegiances is the Bible. The future of Christianity accordingly depends, humanly speaking, on the Bible reader's ability to see and to show that biblical religion has a plain reference to the things of this world, and that the lines along which it would lead us to seek to solve our problems are pointing in the right direction. On any view the Bible may do much to make up what is lacking in the European outlook, for it enables the Western world to hold the gorgeous East in fee. But it matters little that light from the ancient Orient should form part of a liberal education, unless the Bible in truth illuminates the problems of the modern West. " The test of a true faith," said Dr Oman, " is its power to be secular, the extent to which its special religious experiences are tested by the experiences of daily life."[1] The decline in Bible reading belongs to an age which finds biblical religion unable to pass that test, in so far as it troubles to examine the question at all.

At first sight, indeed, the new world of our day seems unlikely soil in which to try to cultivate the remote humanities of old religion. But, could Moses and the prophets be transported hither from antiquity, we might

[1] *Grace and Personality*, 4th ed., p. 81.

hear such comment on the new world as would strengthen our hand in seeking to commend this old-world literature to it. Such a party would find much to make them feel at home in this wonderland of ours, and if their scrutiny were short they might almost forget that they had crossed a gulf of ages and suppose that they had but stepped lightly through the looking-glass. When they saw the enormous extension of human control over natural forces no doubt they would look at each other with a wild surmise—but they might not take long to fit it in to the good biblical doctrine that God made man to replenish the earth and subdue it, putting all things in subjection under his feet. The people whom they would meet still speak of sunset and sunrise, and so they would at first have little reason to suppose that after all the world is round and revolving, and that a great passion for intellectual honesty is a characteristic of the modern man. They might indeed come to the familiar conclusion that by and large human nature has not changed. Dives still loves life. Death is still release for Lazarus. The day for beating swords into ploughshares (or even into hammers and sickles) still seems sadly far away. Saints still serve God for naught, and sinners still serve Him, or repudiate His service, for filthy lucre. In cruelty we are not less abundant, in deeds of mercy not less niggardly. Society still contains free men, and in thin disguises also slaves. All which goes to show that we may send our foreign observers back to the tents of old Israel, assured (if somewhat sadly) that the new world has too much in common with the old for the problems of the old to be without relevance to it.

It is of course first necessary to recognize, without evasion, that many of the grounds upon which it was thought right to commend Bible reading at large, for example in the sixteenth century, are no longer secure. Even within the Christian churches there are many who would not maintain that the Bible is a collection of uniformly inspired oracles beyond the criticism or evaluation of the inquiring spirit. Only by the serious exercise of that spirit can the reader hope to distinguish between knowledge of salvation and knowledge of other matters, for which perhaps the ancient Hebrew genius had less aptitude. This principle proceeds, as Robertson Smith demonstrated last century, from the work of the great Protestant Reformers, who did not (so he used to urge) substitute the infallible

Bible for the infallible Church, but turned the Bible into "the textbook of experimental religion." So it was to be no longer a collection of oracles in which, as Luther said, "you hunted for proof texts like a sow with a bag of oats," but "to appropriate the divine message for our wants, we need no help of ecclesiastical tradition. . . . All that we need is to place ourselves by the side of the prophet, or the apostle, or the psalmist, to enter by spiritual sympathy into his experience, to take home to ourselves the gracious words of divine love."[1] Such doctrine, it is true, tends to make every man his own exegete with such aids to faith as his age, his family, and his church may supply. It is accordingly suspected by some authoritarian interests; but, as no man can be saved by proxy or without his own conviction, it is difficult to see why he should be expected to read the Bible, one traditional road to salvation, by proxy and without the exercise of his own judgment. The rise of biblical criticism has fully justified Coleridge's plea that, for the principle "all that is in the Bible is true religion," the principle "there is true religion in the Bible" should be substituted.[2] The newer position, which seems to be expressly countenanced in the Report of the Doctrinal Commission, has been only partially won after long and bitter controversy, pursued with all the usual apparatus of ecclesiastical unfriendliness.[3] Even to-day it is necessary to enter delicately on the subject, like Agag in the English Bible, or as one who walks *per ignis suppositos cineri doloso*. But the controversy is over for most of us, and we must leave others to look back, always trusting that they will remember Lot's wife. "God when He makes the prophet," said Locke the philosopher, "does not unmake the man." The religion of the Incarnation can have no ultimate interest in challenging that remark.

The story of English Bible reading, it must also be remembered, has dark passages to set against the predominant light. The Englishman has not been slothful in business while searching the scriptures. He has often believed, or behaved as if he believed, that man was made for the Sabbath and not the Sabbath for man. There have been times when he has not suffered the wizard woman to live. In domestic life he has taken long to think

[1] *The Old Testament and the Jewish Church*, Lecture 1. [2] The theme of *The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*. [3] Orthodoxy has had no other history.

in higher terms than those of ownership. As for not coveting, it has just seemed bad business, though by the same sign we have been heavy-handed with thieves. In fact the Englishman, as others elsewhere, has brought much to his Bible reading with which he has seasoned that which he has learned from it. In the seventeenth century Charles I, Oliver Cromwell, and the Levellers all looked in scripture for the proof of their politics, and the use of suitable exegesis justified their search. That is one good reason for studying the Bible critically, with the aim of ascertaining the plain meaning of the text in its first environment irrespective of what the ecclesiastical or political prejudices of the investigator may be. However that may be, long before the establishment of what is technically called "Higher Criticism" there were triumphs of the spirit over the letter. Late in time men came to see that there is no room in a Christian ethic for slavery and the slave trade. That did not happen very long ago. Bishop Westcott, still vividly remembered by many to-day, used to speak of it as happening "only in our time." It might not have happened yet without the open Bible, which indeed precipitated many things which have happened in the last four hundred years. The delay may be partly due to the fact that after all the principle is not explicit but only implicit in the Bible. Before ever St Paul had had enough of ragged runaway Onesimus he sent him back to his master. But to-day no one would undertake to defend slavery on Christian grounds. That is because it has been recognized that such things are incompatible with the Christian doctrine that the human individual is God's child and the object of His love. Such recognition may be seen by the unprejudiced behind a long series of social and humanitarian activities in the last century; for, as we are constantly reminded, Victorian England, though severely critical or even contemptuous of biblical theology, was in no mood to throw over biblical ethics. It is no accident that the Bible-reading age should have been the cradle of socialism, whether Christian or against us. We are now suffering, however, from the dismal realization that we cannot for ever enjoy brotherly love and Christian charity while repudiating the theology from which it springs. Outside some such scheme there is no reason why you should consider your neighbour, and it is all too clear that those who have abandoned it are aware of their emancipation. For to

claim that all men are brothers is a mask that can be assumed and set aside at will by cynics as well as a by-product of the faith of saints. Alone it does not afford any inference that can have a sustained effect on human life or can long be the basis of any action or forbearance. There is but one context in which it carries that kind of cogency, the context of the biblical doctrine of God man's Father in heaven. An ethic without a theology is an ephemeral social contract; a theology without an ethic, which speaks only of man's relation to God and does not look for its realization in man's relation to man, is merely irrelevant to the world of men. In biblical religion the union of these two is indissoluble.

When the Psalmist considered the starry heavens above his mind was filled with awe; but the question he asked was, "What is man, that thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that thou visitest him?" Had he in fact not known equal reverence for the moral law within, he would have conceded the point to the Preacher and forsaken his psalm writing on the ground that all is vanity. This same union of the doctrine of God and the doctrine of man, this same conviction that God's universe of mind and matter is one, is the key to the understanding of the Old Testament prophets, and that according to our modern exegetes is the key to the understanding of the Old Testament. In what we call the Age of Conflict, when Old Testament monotheism was in the making, the prophets fought a bitter war against the most cherished religious beliefs and traditions of their countrymen. They read their theology in the rough winds of heaven, in the heat of the desert sun, in the eternal snows of Lebanon, in the whirlwind, hail and rain. But when you come to ask why after all they did not turn pantheists but monotheists, and why they raised their voice of protest and forsook the ease which comes of acquiescence in society as you find it, the answer is that they were spurred to their preaching by what our modern pulpiteers call the consciousness of human sin. Here at once we can link Old Testament, Apocrypha, and New Testament together, for the Bible as a whole has to do with the kingdom or sovranty of God. His kingdom comes on earth when and where His will is done. When you sin you have recognized His sovranty but repudiated its implications. As this is what usually happens, even the plain man can see that God's kingdom is not of this world.

But in the prophets of the Old Covenant God's kingdom must be recognized in this world or not at all. They were orthodox enough in having no religious interest in immortality. When the shades went down to Sheol, their relationship with God was thought to be over for ever, and their unlovely rest could be broken only by some wizard woman who was careless of their comfort and could summon them back to foretell the future. "The dead praise not thee, O Lord, neither all they that go down into silence." The modernism of the prophets was their new theory of the nature of sin. Sin was of course a serious matter in old Israel, for when one man sinned the whole nation felt itself involved in his guilt, and liable for the consequences, unless suitable atonement could be made in time through the usual channels. For this purpose an elaborate priestly class was maintained to offer sacrifice and make atonement for the sins of Israel. These sins were largely infringements of the laws of "cleanness" and "uncleanness." The chosen people were naturally religious, and seldom careless in these matters. They recognized their responsibilities and paid their tithes in due season, so that at the great shrines the priesthood was rich. Into this smoothly-working ecclesiastical machine the great prophets dropped a bombshell. With the exception of Ezekiel, and perhaps on the estimate of Professor Lods of Isaiah, they showed scant respect for doctrines of purity or uncleanness. Sins there were, however, awful in import, for which the nation would pay full penalty. But the prophets found sin in a different sphere of life. It had of course long been recognized in Israel that man is a social animal before he is an individual (to this rule even Robinson Crusoe was no permanent exception). The prophets found the practice and evidence of human sin in man's relation to man. The sovranty of God, so they preached, was not acknowledged by incense and vain oblations if you reserved the right to ignore the love of the brethren, your fellow men in whose salvation God was as much interested as He was in yours. They spoke therefore of the conditions of the poor, of kindness to orphans and widows, of feeding the hungry and clothing the naked. That is why they seemed to their contemporaries sometimes more like political agitators than revivalist preachers. They had much else to speak of as well, but when those of the priests whom they had convinced came to codify their rhetoric into a work-a-day

religion, and produced something rather like Deuteronomy, they clearly recognized the prophetic teaching that God is well served only by the man who loves his neighbour. In this quality of mercy lay the righteousness of old Israel. When Jeremiah went on to teach that true religion and virtue consisted not only in Everyman respecting the individuality of other people, but also in Everyman himself getting to know God, Hebrew individualism was complete. The doctrine of immortality about which the Sadducees and Pharisees were disputing in New Testament times was merely a corollary. It may be urged, I suppose, that in spite of Deuteronomy the mission of the prophets failed. As the centuries went by flocks and herds remained the plain man's index of sanctity, and the very word for charity lost its prophetic connotation of love of God and neighbour and came to mean mere almsgiving. But Deuteronomy did at least hand the tradition on, and the new Israel every bit as much as the old has earned the rebuke " Go ye and learn what this means, I desire mercy and not sacrifice."[1] What Bishop Westcott called the " Social Gospel," the gospel of the ultimate importance of individuals, is part of the birthright of biblical religion.

If some such reading of the essential spirit of biblical religion be not wholly wide of the mark, and the many other things with which that religion deals can all be understood as variations on much the same theme, then there can be little doubt of the relevance of Bible reading to the things of this world. Indeed, perhaps the most cogent criticism of Christianity is the readiness with which we allow it to die in us of its own growing pains and so surrender our birthright for a precarious mess of pottage. The main conflict of Christianity in our time seems to develop more and more into a conflict between rival doctrines of man, and temporarily to have forgotten the conflict between rival worships of which in the long run this may prove to be but another version. But the current problems which are Everyman's concern about the duty of man to man, of the society to the individual and the individual to society, these problems have at least a counsellor in the love of God and neighbour (which means reverence for both) which is essential to the religion of Jesus. Application of this principle needs no doubt thought and elaboration of detail,[2] lest for example

[1] *Ev. Mat.* ix. 13. [2] See THEOLOGY, the Archbishop of York's article, November, 1939, especially the last paragraph on page 331.

theologians rush in where economists fear to tread. But there is no reason why there should not be Christian economists.[1] For Christians to complain that brotherly love and Christian charity is after all platitudinous, and may therefore be ignored, would be a form of nonsense of which we could not be too intolerant. It has always been easy to substitute respectable inertia, or emotional upheavals, or mechanical ritual for serious conversion. But here where apathy stands watching to cause the love of many to grow cold we can cry Coleridge to the rescue. "To restore a commonplace truth to its first uncommon lustre," he said, "you need only translate it into action. But to do this you must first have reflected on its truth."[2] The signs of the times warn us to think quickly.

H. StJ. Hart.

Occam's Razor

Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem (Entities are not to be multiplied unnecessarily).

Occam was a Nominalist. Realists had maintained that there were Universals. Like Plato they said that beds were beds because they all shared in a "form" or "idea" of "bedness," that all dogs shared a common "dogness," and that this "bedness" and this "dogness" really existed. Occam declared that they existed only in a mind, even if it were God's mind, that abstracted the common idea from many concrete beds and dogs. He argued that they were at best but a product of co-operative thought, useful for certain purposes, even necessary for certain ends, like algebraical signs. But he said that we must not invent things that do not exist. We must not make entities of abstractions. We must not hypostatize ideas. To do so involves us in all kinds of absurdities. "Nor do universals exist in the mind of God as substances or entities" (writes Mr Thilly in his *History of Philosophy*, p. 212); "they are the knowledge which He has of things; like ourselves He has knowledge of particular things which alone have real existence."

"So," said William of Occam, "cut them off." As

[1] See Theology, November, 1939, "Editorial," especially the second paragraph on page 322. [2] *Aids to Reflection*, Introductory Aphorisms, number iii.

Glaucon scoured his characters of the just and the unjust man clean like a man scrubbing statues, Occam set himself to shave off all unnecessary growths of the mind. *Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem.* The phrase, it seems, is not actually found in his writings, but it summarizes the teaching of his *Sum of all Logic* (*Sum. tot. log.* I, 12, 6, as quoted by Mr E. A. Moody in his *The Logic of William of Occam*):

" the positing of a third entity besides the act of understanding and the thing understood is useless."

" What can be explained on fewer principles is needlessly explained by more (*frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora*). Everything, however, which is explained through positing something distinct from the act of understanding can be explained without positing such a distinct thing, for to stand for something and to signify something can belong just as well to the act of understanding as to their fictive entity; therefore one ought not to posit anything else beyond the act of understanding."

This is what is known as the Law of Parcimony of Causes. It warns us against what A. N. Whitehead calls " the fallacy of misplaced concreteness—the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete."

Occam's significance, apart from his political theories and his attitude towards the papacy, is generally held to lie in the fact that his Nominalism paved the way for the advance of natural science. It led people to insist on facts rather than theories. This made short work, as Hume might have said, of philosophers ending " all disputes and enquiries into the matter " by saying " that any phenomenon which puzzles them arises from a faculty or an occult quality." It got rid of their " sympathies and antipathies and horrors of a vacuum." Occam's razor gives short life to the theory that things burn because they had a substance called phlogiston in them. It helped men to pass through what Comte called the metaphysical stage, when, having given up the theological explanation that God giveth His beloved sleep, they substituted the theory that men slept because there was a soporific principle in them, and led them, so he argued, to the positive knowledge of facts.

We are apt to think of Occam's Nominalism as dead and buried or at most as of historical interest, but his razor needs to be kept keen to-day for use, if no longer in natural science, at any rate in present-day theology, ethics, psychology and politics, where as many strange ideas have

made their nests as did birds in the beard of the fatalistic old man of the first of pleasant Mr Lear's " Limericks " in his *Book of Nonsense.*

* * * * *

Personification has its uses in theology, as Occam allowed. If men are not, as the Weeping Philosopher Bias of Priene declared, " all as bad as can be," still sin is, as a fact, universal. Browning saw " reasons and reasons " for believing the Christian Faith, but among them this was chief—that it taught original sin, the corruption of man's heart. So, as our catechism says, we are " born in sin and the children of wrath," and the Ninth Article declares that original sin is the fault or corruption of the nature of every man and is an infection of nature that remains even in those who are baptized. The story of the Fall of Adam was told to explain this common experience, but the fact remains even if the explanation is rejected.

But as an entity it is one of those which should not be multiplied without necessity. The idea of original sin as a self-existing thing has led to many strange doctrines. People have talked about it as if it could exist by itself apart from a sinner. They have spoken of its being transmitted and inherited as cash is inherited by the will of a testator. They have even used the term " original guilt," which is plainly nonsense, as guilt cannot exist in a person who is in no way guilty. But men have argued from this to theories of infant perdition and of the damnation of children unless their original sin is washed away by baptism as if sin were a sort of microbe to be killed by an antiseptic. Instead of regarding baptism as the incorporation into a new life they have talked of it as if it washed away a sort of external dirt. The Church had definitely to cut out the last three words of the earlier draft of the rubric at the end of the Baptismal Service, which ran: " It is certain by God's word that children which are baptized, dying before they commit actual sin, are undoubtedly saved, *or else not* "!

Other strange theories have been built up on this basis. People have seriously argued that our Lord died on the cross for this original sin of ours and that the Mass was to deliver us from actual sins. They have argued that our Lord's mother was not only free from actual sin—that is, that she never did anything wrong—but was also immaculately conceived without original sin: a doctrine easy to

accept, as it is very doubtful, strictly speaking, whether it means anything at all.

The expression "original sin" has, of course, a very real meaning. As the Doctrinal Report (p. 60) says, "It is a fact of experience that man is universally prone to sin—the general conception of original sin was in the first instance suggested by this fact of experience. The term 'original sin' stands for the sinful disposition which is in fact found in all of us from a time apparently previous to any responsible act of choice." In other words it is not, strictly speaking, "sin" at all, since a disposition cannot exist apart from the person disposed except as a mental abstraction, nor sin apart from a sinner.

Strange theories have from time to time been put forward about the Atonement. Arguing from analogy men have talked about a debt paid by the death of Christ and of penalties imposed in God's eternal Court of Justice. They have spoken, as Dr Johnson did, of pacifying "the demands of vengeance by a painful death; of which the natural effect will be, that when justice is appeased, there is a proper place for the exercise of mercy." But there can be no debts apart from a debtor, or penalties apart from the person who suffers, no vengeance except in a vengeful person, no justice apart from a just judge, or mercy unless in one who shows mercy. All this hypostatizing of abstractions prevents people from seeing that atonement can come only from being at one with God in Christ, mystically or sacramentally.

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When we pass from dogmatic theology to moral theology or ethics the matter becomes even more serious. The explanation of the wickedness of men by the theory of original sin is, after all, only a matter of speculation. It is a different thing when it is attributed to the power of an omnipresent and very nearly omnipotent personal devil.

It would be rash to deny the existence of evil spiritual personalities. The attribution of madness or disease to the presence of devils is a perfectly possible explanation of symptoms. Spiritualists speak of "controls" which are frequently ignorant and at times definitely evil. Modern psychology speaks of split personalities and of obsession by apparently alien beings.

Again, for any comprehensive thought we have to

generalize and to personify. Natural science still speaks of energy, attraction, force, laws of nature, which are " anthropic " terms drawn from personal human experience. Social science speaks of humanity, charity, justice, temperance, and fortitude. Poetry and art figure them in human form.

So the universal presence of evil is personified in the devil. Since the times of Zachariah it has been accepted in religious writing. The theme of the book of Job is presented by telling how Satan, the Adversary, came with the sons of God to accuse the righteous man. Goethe in his prologue to *Faust* sets before our eyes the visible embodiment of the spirit that denies.

Nay, more. Our Lord Himself speaks of seeing Satan fall as lightning from heaven. In the account of His temptation—which, unless it is pure invention, must have come from the Saviour Himself—the tempter is represented as quoting scripture to his purpose. We, too, in our baptism renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil. I myself have often said that " it is the devil's favourite lie that a man cannot live chastely and that fornication is natural."

But that does not commit me to a belief in a personal devil. Our Lord did not see a figure literally fall from heaven, and if He had done so it would not have looked like lightning. He would, as has been said, have been very surprised at meeting a specious sophist in the wilderness, and His biblical quotations as mere quotation would not have proved very difficult to cap. If the devil was only a person the Temptation would not have lasted forty days but a few minutes.

So we continue to use such personifications. We say, with St Paul, that charity suffereth long and is kind; but that does not mean that a particular woman whom Sir Joshua Reynolds painted with a child in her arms and several others clinging to her dress is never cross or impatient with them. Nor in denying that charity is a woman do we excuse ourselves from being longsuffering and merciful in our hearts.

Occam's razor must shave off all this hypostatizing of abstractions. The popular belief in a personal devil is bad theology. It is not Christianity but Manicheeism. It implies a dualism of a good omnipotent God and a bad nearly omnipotent one. It is the old Persian teaching of

Ormuzd and Ahriman. As Professor Burkitt writes in his *Religion of the Manichees* (p. 75): " It is an obvious fact that the old-fashioned religious view of the devil is not very different from the dualism of Mani."

It is bad philosophy too, for an absolutely evil being would be non-existent. As Augustine pointed out, if the devil is supposed to have existence, and since existence comes from God, he still has some good in him and some relation to God. As George Herbert wrote:

> " We paint the devil foul, yet he
> Hath some good in him, all agree.
> Sin is flat opposite to th' Almighty, seeing
> It wants the good of vertue, and of being."

The necessary corollary to the popular belief is that of Origen, who held that the devil would be ultimately saved, and that of Augustus Hare, who at the age of four asked if he might not pray for him.

It is bad religion also, not only because it has been bound up with some of the worst horrors of persecution for witchcraft, or even because it was in the Middle Ages indirectly the cause of countless deeds of cruelty to animals, as when St Dominic " deliberately plucked alive a wretched sparrow which disturbed his preaching and which he therefore imagined to be the devil." It was perhaps not directly responsible in either case. But it has encouraged the idea that temptation is only occasional and local, and, perhaps worst of all, it has lent itself to the flippancy and jocoseness that is the natural consequence of a doctrine that people do not really believe because it seems to them absurd.

So with the conception of sin generally. It is quite right to preach the forgiveness of sins in which we profess our belief in the Creed. St John was right in pointing out Christ by the Sea of Galilee as the Lamb that taketh away the sins of the world. And *Agnus Dei qui tollis peccata mundi, dona nobis pacem* is the natural prayer of the Christian who approaches the altar. But the moment we begin to regard sin as something apart from the sinner, as something external to us as the burden was bound on the back of Christian in the *Pilgrim's Progress*, and got rid of by something external as his was by the sight of the cross, we need Occam's razor. An external rite may have the external effect of absolution and restoration to the visible communion of the Church, but sin can be got rid of only by penitence,

by real sorrowing on the part of the sinner, by owning up and by his doing his best to make up for what he has done—by contrition, confession, and satisfaction. The idea is still more common than we think that sin is done away with by "accepting the scheme of salvation" rather than by "giving your heart to God."

We need not multiply examples. As Hume said, "imagination is more affected by what is particular than by what is general." The use of abstract terms as if they represented realities apart from the real things they are abstracted from leads people to deceive themselves. They talk of dogs barking at the approach of death as if death had any existence before a person dies. They praise (or deprecate) charity and only too easily excuse themselves from doing any charitable acts themselves. They applaud the Golden Rule without asking "Who is my neighbour?" "Humanity" has a very real meaning to one who, like Abou ben Adhem, loves his fellow-men; but it is only too easy to follow Rousseau, who, it has been said, loved Humanity and quarrelled with every specimen of the human race that he came across in the flesh. Eighteenth-century Romanticism sentimentalized about abstractions. The pages of its literature were full of words beginning with capital letters and produced a general feeling of unreality and falseness in thought. For, as Jeremy Taylor wrote a century before in his *Rules and Advice to the Clergy*:

"generals not explicated do but fill the people's heads with empty notions, and their mouths with perpetual unintelligible talk, but their hearts remain empty and themselves are not edified."

And many of our sermons to-day would do with a close shave by Occam's razor. For, as Bishop Butler charged his clergy of Durham (§ 19):

"General exhortations to piety, abstracted from the particular circumstances of it, are of great use to such as are already got into a religious course of life; but, such as are not, though they be touched with them, yet when they go away from church, they scarce know where to begin, or how to set about what they are exhorted to. Particular rules and directions then concerning the times and circumstances of performing acknowledged duties, bring religion nearer to practice and such as are really proper, and cannot well be mistaken, and are easily observed. Such particular rules in religion, prudently recommended, would have an influence upon the people."

In the lecture room we have pretty well got rid of the old faculty psychology, though in common speech people still talk about "training the memory" and advocate making children learn by heart things they cannot understand. Some, I am afraid, still talk about "breaking a child's will." Phrenology, too, an extreme form of this "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," still has its disciples.

But more serious is the popular use of the term "motive," which is confused with "desire." Everyone, of course, acts from his strongest motive, for the fact that he so acts is what shows it to be the strongest, whereas it is well known from experience that we do not always yield to our strongest desires. It is not merely a verbal confusion. People talk of a man obeying his strongest motive, whereas, of course, each act has only one motive—namely, the "moving why," as Burns called it, which made him choose between various conflicting desires and do what he did. This confusion of thought encourages a very common form of determinism, due very largely to Hobbes and popularized by Bentham, who wrote of motives as if they were irresistible forces outside a man coming from his "two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure." But motives do not exist apart from the man who moves any more than courage exists "floating loose in the world" apart from the "acts and character of a courageous man." "Percepts and appetites," writes Dr J. Ward in his *The Realm of Ends* (p. 790),

> "that nobody owns are not percepts and appetites at all. To talk of motives conflicting of themselves is as absurd as to talk of commodities competing in the absence of traders. Again, if there is only a bundle of percepts and motives, but no self to determine or control, it is obvious that there can be no self to be determined or controlled."

As Bishop Butler says (*Preface to Sermons*, § 35): "No one can act but from a choice or preference of his own."

So, too, the statement that man "has a soul" is one that should be got rid of. "How do we know that we have got a soul?" is a question I have been asked more than once. Man is body and soul. Or rather he *is* a soul that uses a body. What the questioner means is probably, "What reason have we for believing that we shall live after death?" But this confusion becomes greater when an experience that has been forgotten is personified and made an entity under the title of "The Unconscious," and

confusion becomes more confounded when other entirely unnecessary entities are multiplied such as the censor, the libido, the ego, the ego ideal, and even the id, with which, as Dr McDougall says, Freud, indulging an unfortunate tendency of popular thinking, has encumbered the earth.

When bad psychology and bad politics combine to multiply unnecessary entities the case is perhaps worst of all. Rousseau began with his theory of a general will which wiped out all he had insisted upon about the rights of the individual. Now undoubtedly a complex thing is more than the sum of its parts. The first line of Hamlet's soliloquy is more than a compound of the words it uses as a sentence, and the State is more than the aggregate of a number of men each of whom wills. When men get together mutual influence inhibits peculiarities and what is common to all gains force. This greatest common measure of differing wills may be picturesquely described as a general will and made a sanction of Acts of Parliament. But it is not an exact term, and certainly personality, which alone can will, must not be ascribed to it.

But when Fichte (1762-1814) had urged an education which "consisted essentially in this that it completely ignored the freedom of the will" in the individual, and Hegel (1770-1831) had followed with his theory of the State as a "self-knowing and self-actualizing individual," and Nietzsche had elaborated his conception of the Superman with his "will to power," all these imaginary entities floating about in the air only too easily have become identified with a will that has a very real existence in the personality of a dictator who is held to be "always right."

* * * * *

It is argued that no one seriously believes in all these entities that we have detailed—original sin, a personal devil, humanity apart from human beings, charity without deeds, sin as a burden, phlogiston and soporific principles, phrenological bumps, souls which are not ourselves but possessions, motives which nobody has, a censor who obsesses us, a general will of an impersonal state—and that therefore no particular harm is done.

But the harm is there and it is serious. Such talk creates a vague undefined belief that Christianity is unreasonable. Forensic theories of the Atonement, the attribution of sin to infants, insistence on doctrines that may mean nothing

at all, lead, only too easily, to a repudiation of all dogma and a decrying of the intellectual presentation of Christianity in theology and creeds. They may easily obscure the truth that atonement is effected by personal union with God in Christ, that Christianity is a social life into which children are incorporated in baptism to counteract from the beginning the dangers of heredity and environment, that sentimentality is the great foe of sincere feeling, and that insincere feeling is often more harmful than mistaken thought.

It may easily create a sense of flippancy leading men to make cheap jokes about the devil and hell, and meanwhile lose sight of the value of personification to remind us of eternal principles and keep in our minds the thoughts of the universality of evil and the eternal consequences of wrong acts. It may create an impression that our religion has little to do with reality, that men do not need to " worry about their sins," so that, sitting light to abstractions as products of the imagination, they may fail to realize the real entities from which they are drawn.

Finally, it may strike at the roots of moral responsibility by throwing the blame of our actions on to external forces existing outside ourselves, on motives and complexes, by bowing down to the general will of the totalitarian state, instead of recognizing that we are ourselves responsible for our actions, that we form our own habits and must worship God and not any image that Nebuchadnezzar or any other dictator may set up in the plains of Dura or anywhere else.

There is no necessity for these entities, and they should not, as Occam told us, be multiplied.

CLEMENT F. ROGERS.

The World of God and the World of Wells—II

IV.—BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS

IN the previous article we drew attention to the correspondence between much present-day Christianity and the Jewish Law, and then described the general attitude to life in which this severely moralistic Christianity contrives to find a place. This attitude we called the " World of Wells," in opposition to the world of the New Testament. It now remains to consider the bearing of these facts about

the background of " modern young people " as they affect the evangelistic task of the Church.

We saw from the analysis of the " modern mind " how sharply the battle must be joined, and how evangelism involves a total reorientation of the *whole* personality. The " modern mind " is a misnomer, a relic of rationalism. What it means is the attitude to the whole of life of the whole of a modern person.

It follows that evangelism must be the same kind of total conversion of persons in a community that it is on the " mission field." The old distinction between " individual conversion " and " the social implications of the gospel " was always false; it is now in addition meaningless. To convert the members of my generation means, usually,[1] to remove them from one world into another, quite different. (In a university it means that the S.C.M. has, as part of its evangelistic task, to try to provide an intellectual framework quite different from and opposed to that unconsciously provided by the university. I imagine that the same, though not necessarily in the intellectual sphere, holds good in the parish.)

But the difference between beliefs and assumptions raises a new difficulty. It is not enough to ask people to believe in the Christian faith. We shall find them still going on in the same old ways, without any sense of incongruity. The Gospel will not make touch with their essential paganism in the mind. The " World of Wells " is not learnt by precept but by absorption, unconsciously. The *Daily Mirror*, for example, is more widely read, by students at any rate, than any other newspaper. It does not preach that " love is the sweetest thing." But its half-page on astrology, all the cosmetics advertisements, many of the other advertisements, and much of the alleged news, take that for granted. When you have read it for some time, *you* take it for granted, too. Hollywood's influence is the same. So is the effect of singing for years on end dance tunes of which three-quarters deal with the subject of love. Or, on another point, what must be the effect of living among machines—in factories, in the propaganda of the gas and electric companies, in the reiterated suggestion that labour-saving devices and canned food are the way to heaven, and that in a period when scientists are with a few exceptions the only heroes we have? (The exceptions are film stars,

[1] Even with those from Christian homes, for, as we saw, " Christian " homes means Wellsian homes with " Christian ethics " thrown in.

athletes, and explorers; they represent health and beauty in the Brave New World.)

It is a commonplace theme; the list could go on interminably. But though it is commonplace I doubt whether we realize it with sufficient imaginative urgency. Instead of going to the "flicks" only when there is a good film, let us take to going occasionally when there is a bad film. In the inevitable boredom, we can consider its theme, the treatment of its theme, and the effect of these on those who go twice or thrice weekly. Or we can stand for some time outside a radio shop pouring out dance music from Radio Normandie—or tune in our own set to the same station—and meditate on the religious significance of what we hear. Again, Kraemer utters in *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* a warning against making schematic statements of other faiths, and trying to see where the Christian can find "points of contact." That way we miss the life, the inner core, of the faith. In that sense the scheme of the Wellsian world on an earlier page was dangerous. But it can be corrected by a *theological* examination of the writers who "go down" well: the "prophets"—Wells himself, Shaw, Gerald Heard, Douglas Reed; the observers—Noel Coward, Rose Macaulay, E. M. Delafield (especially Coward, who is an accurate and cynical observer, and yet contrives to be almost a "prophet"); the "good novelists"—Priestley, Cronin, Walpole. Such a theological examination of the writers to whom resort is had when profound thought or good literature is wanted will not only be revealing, but may help to save us at least from lapsing into that standardless criticism which is the literary match of religious sentimentalism.

This theological examination of life at all levels is an urgent need. It is being admirably carried out by the Christian philosopher and theologian—Dawson, Maritain, Demant, Niebuhr, Berdyaev, Barth. It is being done, more rarely, at a more apprehensible level in books like *The Good Pagan's Failure*, by Rosalind Murray, and *On to Orthodoxy*, by D. R. Davies. But we need also something less scholarly, something almost vulgar. The study of "anthropocentric humanism," even a simply-written account of the failure of the liberal humanist, is not of much direct use to the shepherd of sheep in the parish. What he needs is a Christian "mass observation." (Much would be gained by an earnest study by theologically competent Christians of "mass observa-

tion" itself.) In default of a Christian "M.O.," we can use our eyes and ears, giving a theological twist to our observations, and bearing in mind the differing value of different kinds of evidence. For, to return to assumptions, it is only when we have an imaginative understanding of the heresies that lie deep in men that we shall be able to make contact with them with the Gospel.

V.—JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH

What is the link between the two worlds we have rather cursorily examined? The immediate effect of convincing people of the falsity of their assumptions about the nature of man, on which everything turns, is to induce despair. "What the Law imparts is consciousness of sin."

"But," continues the apostle without a break, "we have a righteousness of God disclosed apart from law altogether." The link between the two worlds is the doctrine of justification by faith. That doctrine asserts not that our nature is suddenly changed, which is untrue, but that our status with God is changed, which is true and all-important. We are no longer locked in a dilemma between sentimentality and cynicism. The sentimental belief that a little more of what we already have will be sufficient for all our needs is what people are to be converted from. The cynical despair which is, apart from the Gospel, the inevitable result of seeing through sentimentalism is neither necessary nor true. The doctrine of justification assures us that, though we are sinners, we are forgiven.

Forgiveness is the most essential element in justification. The existence of human moral standards and divided human wills is proof that man's nature is to be responsible. The forgiveness of God restores him to his true attitude and status by making it possible for him to be responsible to God. No longer in estrangement and rebellion, he can cry "Abba, Father." This word of forgiveness creates a new man. Forgiveness imparts love; from living away from the love of God in frustration and division, man is restored to life in the love of God. His understanding of himself is restored in the self-giving word of God. (*Cf.* "Man does not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.") To fall away from the word is to have one's personality divided, and so to become impersonal (as the modern world is impersonal).

By justification the right relation to God is restored, and also the unity of the personality (that is *peace*) and the truly personal life (that is *love*). Christian personal relationships are possible only to the justified.

This act of God is a truly creative act; the result is not merely judicial acquittal but a "new man." The new position is not only an act of God, however; it is also new knowledge and new obedience. Through faith in Christ man responds to God by becoming loving. His life in love reflects the love of God. "We love because He first loved us." This is a miracle; the fact that God's grace does change men and women is a miracle. But miracle is not magic. There is a new centre, a new start, a new power, and the promise of perfection. But the old is not immediately destroyed. That would be magic; and some kinds of evangelism have sought magic in this sense rather than miracle. "It doth not *yet* appear what we shall be." In spite of new life we continue to sin; yet the experience of forgiveness and victory assures us that in the fullness of time both sin and temptation shall be done away. "It doth not yet appear *what we shall be*." Though we are perplexed, it is not unto despair; though we are cast down, we are not destroyed. Sin, though it continues, hath no more *dominion over us*.

It is sometimes urged that "Christ liveth in me" (and other texts interpreted in that direction) constitutes a refutation of this "concession" to the power of sin. But the full text is, "I live, yet it is not I that live, but Christ liveth in me." I live: my life with its sins and follies goes on. Yet its centre is no longer I, with my sins and follies; its centre is another, Christ. I can say in one breath that I live in my sinfulness and Christ lives in me in His perfection. No doubt God could have made us perfect at once, but He manifestly did not do so, for good reasons which are not wholly hidden from us.

This doctrine has the merit of a profound treatment of the moral problem, far profounder than that of the moralist or idealist, Christian or non-Christian. It does not involve us in the sentimental approach to life's troubles which is commonly supposed to be Christian. ("Oh, I couldn't tell the vicar; he would be so shocked.") It also saves us from the enervating effects, not only of sheer cynical pessimism, but also of frustrated idealism. There are too many to-day who feel that if you cannot have the ideal

you can have nothing, for to have the second-best is to " compromise." (This is a partial explanation of the " retreat to the ivory tower " of some formerly very " activistic " intellectuals on the political Left.) The doctrine recognizes the power of sin, and that it will not be at once overcome. It also recognizes that nothing but the power of God can overcome it. It assures us that the power of God has overcome the power of sin once for all in the Person and Work of Jesus Christ, which opens a new era in human history. The benefit of His work is available for us. The power of sin in us is broken. New life is now ours in principle; the manner in which we experience this gift is the assurance that it will when God pleases be ours fully. So we are enabled to " get on with the job," knowing that God will take up our attempts and our failures, our aspirations and our achievements, into His purpose; we can work for the Kingdom of God the more earnestly and zealously, because we know that the terrible responsibility for " building " it is not ours, but God's. Our responsibility is to become what we already are—the burden of so much of Paul's exhortation to his converts. Now we see in a glass darkly, but then face to face. Paul's cry of joy—" Who shall separate us from the love of God ?"—derives its meaning from the terribly realistic quality of the experience and thought which is set before it.

A doctrine of this strength, so radically opposed to the assumptions of modernity, demands the support of an equally strong theology. The experience of forgiveness and the assurance of perfection rest not on the eloquence of the preacher or the enthusiasm of the community into which we are received, nor yet on some power of self-hypnotism. Conversion is a phenomenon not confined to Christianity. The non-Christian mystics know it; more relevant to the English Church is the fact that the Communist party and the psycho-analytical schools know it. The value of my conversion depends on the object to which I am converted. For Christianity, this is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. It is He who justifies me; my justification rests on His historic act in Jesus Christ. " I know that my Redeemer liveth." But I must also know who my Redeemer is. I require the assistance of a strong theology, so strong and so fundamental to the Church in which I have been incorporated that it is simple enough for me to understand and make my own, so that I too shall be held

by a religion which is fundamental to me, and whose ideas are strong and clear, not weak and vague.

There is a further point, implicitly met in the last paragraph. Paul found, as we do, that he was accused by the legalists of teaching that we should sin in order that grace may abound. People who have been impressed with their own radical sinfulness, and correspondingly with the miracle of their justification, tend to think that their past sins were an advantage. (It is very likely that the Prodigal Son thought so, at times.) From this point it is not very far to the belief that the more we sin the greater is the scope for the grace of God. The only answer Paul found was that, if we think that, then we have not understood much of the character of God, and the cost to Him of our sin.

The danger of the doctrine of justification lies here. It is the point upon which the legalists always seize, as when they rebuked Jesus for justifying publicans and sinners and consorting with them. The danger can be overcome only when we realize, not only with our minds but with our imaginations also, the quality and greatness of our Redeemer. This means, I should say *chiefly*, the practice of meditation. Meditation is at present too widely regarded as something that is for the spiritually mature, the naturally pious, or the mystically inclined. There can be no greater mistake. But it is a natural mistake, for the handbooks on the subject are frequently of a depressingly pious brand, when they are not frankly for the use of people with more time and more experience than is common. This is a need that it is important to fill for a further reason. If it is true that it is the imagination that sets the will in motion; if it is true that the assumptions of the "World of Wells" are as deeply rooted as we have suggested, then it will be by meditation on the person, work, and character of our Lord that that "world" will be eliminated. What we require, then, is something fulfilling several conditions. We want simplicity, and a great deal of elementary help as to how you meditate. We want an adequate level of scholarship, for a good deal of devotion to our Lord undermines the faith by suggesting that history does not matter. More important even than scholarship is a radically biblical quality, so that meditation and theology cohere with worship and practice to produce a unitary Christian character. Finally, we want the writers to keep one eye all the time on the task of

illuminating the contrast between the World of God and the World of Wells, so that the unitary Christian character understands the non-Christian world in which he moves, knows why and in what ways he is a sojourner and a stranger in it, and can, in brief, adequately cope with it.

(*Concluded.*)

DAVID M. PATON.

Christianity and Culture: Replies to Mr Lewis

I

I AM impelled to say something more upon this subject by the article of Mr C. S. Lewis, under the same title, in your March issue. To attempt some reply to Mr Lewis is, I feel, even more my prerogative than Brother George Every's, since Brother Every did at least achieve dishonourable mention, whereas Mr Lewis found it possible to outline his position entirely without reference to my article "Poetry and Belief" (in THEOLOGY for July, 1939), in which I imagined I had said one or two things apropos. I dislike controversy, but I am encouraged by the candour and charity of Mr Lewis's exposition to attempt some further exposition of my own standpoint—for I have no authority, of course, to speak for Brother Every. I believe Mr Lewis to be seriously mistaken in some matters, though in others the differences between us may resolve themselves into a question of terminology rather than belief. In any event I want him and those who think with him to have the opportunity of again considering the arguments for the other side. My missionary fervour in such a cause must appear ridiculous from their point of view; but I am convinced that that is because we have quite different notions of what constitutes culture. Mr Lewis is not hardy enough to attempt a definition. Nor am I; but the significance I attach to the word will emerge in what follows.

On the face of it, the paradox is surely Mr Lewis's, in asserting the irrelevance of culture to Christianity. He has quoted sound authority on his side—though I question the application of this authority—but if we take the *consensus fidelium*, it is surely on my side of the question. The Church has been proud of its cultural heritage: its excellent buildings,

adorned with works of art; its music; its devotional literature. There are many who like to point out that the Blessed Thomas Aquinas proved himself a poet when he turned to the Offices for the feast of Corpus Christi; and though St Augustine condemned the secular culture of his day, he has been acclaimed as among the founders of a Christian culture which took its place. If he feared that he attended too closely to the delights of Church music, that is not a condemnation of Church music but of his own indiscipline. We know that nothing creaturely must be exalted into an end; but desires can be legitimate, and legitimate desires are to be directed and controlled, not suppressed. We do not starve ourselves for fear of the sin of gluttony, though we may fast in the interests of self-control. Similarly, to pay more attention to the music than the Mass is undoubted sin, but controlled attention to the music, like temperate feeding, may increase our alertness in the service of God. Mr Lewis's position logically implies an heretical theology, which I know he would formally repudiate—the Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity, according to which the values of the natural order are without positive relation to supernatural values, and natural good and evil come alike under God's arbitrary condemnation. The Catholic would baptize the natural order into Christ, distinguishing between those aspects of the natural order now Christianized and those left pagan. Further, among the latter, he would distinguish between those products of pagan culture so warped as to be more dangerous than helpful, and those which, although sub-Christian, are more helpful than dangerous to a Christian reader. Hellenic morality is emphatically sub-Christian, but Greek poetry does express a religious attitude to the universe which Wordsworth, for instance, was sometimes anxious to recapture. And since morality is more consciously apprehended than such general religious attitudes, a false morality may be the more readily discounted, so that the danger here is less than the spiritual benefit conferred by a pervasive religious feeling.

Another theological error, related to the Calvinism I have just discussed, seems also to be implied in Mr Lewis's position. He writes as if he believed salvation to be an individual matter, though again I am sure that this is not a doctrine he would consciously maintain. Salvation is, of course, only possible (so far as we know) within the community

of the Church. And salvation is not of the spirit only, but of the whole person—another aspect of orthodox theology which Mr Lewis appears to have overlooked, and with which my own conception of culture is strictly bound up.

Modern psychologists have talked a great deal of nonsense, and they have often crowed the most excitedly over eggs addled a good many centuries ago. And when they have talked sense, it has usually been traditional common sense which they have appropriated by dressing it in a professional jargon. I am no devotee of the psychologists. But a good thing has come out of this psychological preoccupation, and out of twentieth-century scepticism concerning human reason: it has led to the intellectual discovery of the non-rational elements in human nature. To ignore man's rational nature is absurd; but to ignore man's irrational nature is also absurd. The Catholic faith, which reconciles all opposites in its eternal wisdom, holds the balance of human personality. St Paul knew the pull of the irrational nature: " The evil which I would not, that I do." " Where your treasure is," we are told, " there will your heart be also ": and it is commonly taught that we may believe ourselves to be worshippers of the true God, and yet, in the unexamined recesses of our irrational nature, our real devotion may be given to an unworthy object—to wealth, or health, or indeed to the arts (for to transfer to a creature, however exalted, the priority due to God, would be the sin of idolatry). But among " intellectuals," though not among churchmen, there had been a dangerous tendency to ignore unconscious motivation, until this century cast a lurid light into the mental basement. We now realize that in talking of the ideas of a writer or of an age, it is necessary to take into account not only those held consciously, but also those held unconsciously. And the conscious and the unconscious might well contradict one another. Fr Demant, in *The Religious Prospect*, redefines doctrine and dogma: doctrine to signify conscious beliefs, dogma to signify unconscious beliefs. He points out, for instance, that the doctrine of nineteenth-century Liberalism was Christian, but its dogma unchristian; its doctrine of the dignity of man contradicting its dogma of mechanical progress. Now both the doctrine and the dogma of a period are expressed in its art. The doctrine, being conscious, is easily recognized, and the philosopher-critics

tease it out from the substance of a poem (or whatever the art-form may be) and parade it in triumph as if they had got to the real heart of the mystery. But the dogmas (which I called "attitudes"—after Dr Richards—and "unconscious beliefs" in my "Poetry and Belief") are the important factors, for where doctrine and dogma differ, it is dogma which provides the unconscious ground of action. In a poem, for example, the attitudes which are unconsciously implied in the very choice of epithets, constitute the poet's real, practical philosophy—his dogmas; and some of these will be the dogmas of his age, so that a comparison of many writers will reveal the fundamental unconscious beliefs of their age.

Now this Mr Lewis himself recognizes when he speaks of "the principal values actually implicit in European literature," and suggests "material prosperity" for the Victorians and "liberation of impulses" for our own contemporaries. His other suggestions I am less sure of, and the whole is much too sweeping (as no doubt he is aware). But, at least, he will agree with me, I feel sure, that if we take the popular fiction of to-day, its unconscious attitudes, or, in Fr Demant's terminology, its fundamental dogmas, are usually rooted in some form of biological or economic naturalism, even when the conscious mind pays superficial lip-service to the Christian code. "Urges" and "overmastering passions" abound; the shop-girl achieves her sables or "sees her name in lights." To the untrained reader this sort of thing can be dangerous, and the less conscious these false attitudes are, the more dangerous they become. It is relatively easy to resist a clear statement of doctrine, but a pervasive atmosphere of unconscious irreligion can unconsciously infect those who are not fortified by training against its influence. There is no doubt that to-day the popular novel and magazine and film, together with the increasingly subtle suggestion of Big Business advertising, all create an atmosphere of unconscious irreligion, in which it is difficult for the simple Christian to live without infection. Salvation, as I said, is of the whole self, and in the community of the Church. We cannot be content with congregations who are consciously Christian and unconsciously materialist in outlook: divided against themselves, they cannot stand. Our hopes for a Christian community in the future must, surely, include a hope for popular arts and crafts which will unconsciously, and so

truly,[1] express the Christian outlook. In theological matters —matters of conscious belief—the Church community has always contained a minority specially devoted to the preservation of the faith in its purity; the function of these theological specialists being to detect error and expound the truth, to rebuke superstition and laxity, and to encourage everything favourable to the growth of true faith. And now, when we realize the importance of unconscious attitudes, and when the Church must live in a world unconsciously lapsing into irreligion,[2] do we not need a similar minority of trained critics who may lay bare the false values of contemporary culture (in the so-called "good" books as well as the railway-bookstall type, though the latter are frequently more dangerous, as their readers are less able to defend themselves against false suggestion), who may thus put the faithful on their guard and reveal to the faithless the inadequacy of their own poverty-stricken values, and who may encourage within the Church the growth of a distinctive culture, truly and unequivocally Christian? There is no suggestion here that culture, in the sense of a liberal education, is necessary to salvation, or is even desirable for the majority of Christians.[3] But no one can escape culture in my sense of the word—culture good, bad, or indifferent; Christian, anti-Christian, or indifferent. And the quality of the surrounding culture affects the quality of life in the Christian community: as Mr Eliot has recently pointed out, it is at the moment harder than it should be to live an ordinary Christian life, to achieve the rudiments or make the beginnings of being saved. A Christian culture would at least not impede salvation; indeed, it would assist it by making the first stages of Christian behaviour unconscious and habitual. The stock response, I agree, is necessary in the ordinary individual, if it's the right response; though in a poet or critic there must be no stock responses in working hours, for poet and critic must constantly renew and authenticate their experience, lest they be led into temptation, and take the easy way of saying what everybody says, because

[1] Consciously as well, of course; but the penetration of the unconscious by Christian attitudes is a guarantee of practical religion. [2] I say "irreligion" advisedly instead of "paganism," for pagans were and are often religious. [3] I do not share the optimism of *Scrutiny* in thinking that educational reforms might bring critical sensitivity to all. This wild hope has to me the savour of pseudo-religion.

everybody says it. This duty of vigilance, however, is laid only upon a few, in accordance with the Pauline doctrine of different functions for various members of Christ's body.

Now I should agree with Mr Lewis that we have never yet experienced a wholly Christian culture, but I insist that that is no reason why we should not hope for one, and meanwhile distinguish the good from the bad, and the Christian from the non-Christian (not necessarily the same things) in the works of art we already possess. I am not substituting a mere moralistic for an amoralistic view of culture. A poem, for example, may contain sound Christian doctrine and be a bad poem; it may contain even sound Christian dogma woven into its very texture and be a bad poem. For a poet must have insight and sensibility, and also special aptitudes in the manipulation of words: a sense of rhythm, of the stresses and strains of the spoken word, metrical facility, and an extensive vocabulary. There may be good poetry, moreover, which a Christian must condemn. But positing two poems, one Christian, one non-Christian, not only in conscious belief but in unconscious attitudes, and granting these to be equally successful communications of poetic experience, I should not only commend the Christian poem as Christian, but I should expect it to reveal a more subtle, balanced, and mature combination of attitudes—to be more "objective." For since Christianity is true, the poet who sees with Christian eyes sees deeper into the significance of life, just as to return to Aquinas from modern non-Christian philosophers is to return from bad dreams to the last refinement of common sense. The best poetry is necessarily Christian. And in this way a non-Christian may be led, from the comparative crudity of non-Christian values, to turn to Christian art and find there the beginnings of his faith.

Despite the citations of Mr Lewis, we all know that there are Christian writers as well as non-Christian. And we do not need the elaborate and mistaken psychology of Dr Richards to tell us that some books are inspiring (the stock response !) and can have even a practical effect upon the ordering of our spiritual lives. I myself believe the greatest of Christian poets to be William Shakespeare; but Mr Lewis suspects him of infecting scholarship candidates with amoralism. The blame is not Shakespeare's; it belongs entirely to those old-fashioned methods of character-criticism still popular in Oxford. But I had intended to

bear an olive branch, not a light blue banner, and to leave differences of critical judgment for a more favourable occasion, when I hope these fundamental differences will have disappeared. I have tried to reduce to its bare bones a corpus of critical belief which I think Mr Lewis is bound to find intelligible, and at least not *a priori* an impossible one for a Christian to profess. If I were not timid of associations I should conclude with the query: Can such a faith offend?

S. L. Bethell.

II

An article under this title in the March number of Theology, by my friend Mr C. S. Lewis, has troubled me a little, so that, though I make no more claim to be a theologian than he does, or even less, I venture to put forward my difficulties. Since I do not find his argument convincing I should rather like to know if it is "orthodox."

His question is: How can it be "the duty or interest of creatures who are every minute advancing either to heaven or hell" to spend any of those minutes on the study of literature, since (by the teaching of Newman, which he explicitly accepts) "it is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Literature of sinful man"?

I cannot help thinking that he obscures his main argument, which is a moral one, by confusing it with the historical question as to what views of literature are to be found in the New Testament or the Fathers. Apparently if he had got what he wanted there he would have been satisfied; as he does not, he argues the case on its merits. So ought he not to have done this at once? If he appeals to Cæsar, by Cæsar's decision he must abide.

He starts in the puritanical tradition by text-hunting in the Gospels. Not finding much to his purpose, he resorts to such suggestions as that "secular learning may be embodied in the Magi," and that "the miracle at Cana in Galilee could be taken to sanctify at least a recreational use of culture." But he quickly admits that such ingenuity was wasted, since Scripture need not "contain everything important or even everything necessary." For this daring he shelters himself under the authority of Hooker, and on that authority proceeds to research among other authorities, including, unexpectedly, Plato[1] and Aristotle. He is

[1] For the assertion that "Plato will tolerate no culture that does not directly or indirectly conduce either to the intellectual vision of the good

seriously worried because St Augustine thought tragedy a scab and because St Jerome thought poetry was the food of demons, but a little consoled that Gregory thought secular culture was like getting the Philistines to sharpen our knives.

Now I venture to ask whether all this is not sheer antiquarianism. I do not say antiquarian knowledge is valueless, but it is irrelevant to the decision of a moral question. And I ask whether a Christian is committed to such a method of deciding it. Why do we respectfully consider any moral precept in the Gospels? Surely because most of them are approved by our conscience and reason. Why do we think that Scripture does not "contain everything important or even everything necessary"? Not because Hooker has said so, but because our consciences agree with his in finding several morally important and even necessary things not there contained. And if they are not all contained there, it will hardly be contended that they must all be in St Augustine or St Jerome. If Plato was definitely wrong in thinking poetry is essentially an imitation, others may have been as wrong in thinking it a scab, the food of demons, or a justifiable bit of sharp practice.

So far as our conscience often agrees with theirs we shall listen respectfully when it differs, but, if their arguments do not convince it, we cannot without impious temerity shuffle off on them the responsibility of disobeying it. Surely no candid Christian believes that all his duties about slavery or pauperism or unemployment or war are sufficiently prescribed in the Fathers. Perhaps Mr Lewis agrees. Perhaps he does not call Newman an "authority." Anyhow, he rejects his conclusion and proceeds to "construction" on his own account. He finds the following defences or palliations of literary study:

1. It is allowable, like permanent waving, as a remunerative way of supplying a "not actually deleterious" demand.

2. Though perhaps we ought, if we could, to abolish culture, yet since we cannot, we ought perhaps to resist its abuse. "The mere presence of Christians in the ranks

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or the military efficiency of the commonwealth," I think Mr Lewis must be relying on the early and political *Republic*. In later dialogues reference to "the good" is dropped and dialectic practised as an instrument of knowledge for its own sake—that is to say, knowledge *is* good (see Stenzel, *Plato's Dialectic*, translated by Allan). Nor does Plato clearly distinguish the vision of the good from the vision of the beautiful.

of the culture-sellers will inevitably provide an antidote." So a Christian is as much justified in selling culture as permanent waves.

3. Poetry affords pleasures innocent in themselves, like permanent waves, though like them capable of misuse. So "we may enjoy them ourselves and lawfully, even charitably, teach others to enjoy them. . . . We should have to be Benthamites on the issue between pushpin and poetry." Both may keep us out of mischief.

4. The real defence is twofold:

(*a*) Of the "values implicit in European literature" some, such as honour, sexual love, pantheistic contemplation of nature and romantic *Sehnsucht*, though sub-Christian, may, with danger indeed, be used as protreptic to Christianity. "Culture has a distinct part to play in bringing certain souls to Christ."[1]

(*b*) Finally, culture has a part to play even in the life of the converted. (i) "We must rest and play, and where can we do so better than" among "the dim antepasts and ectypes of the truth"? (ii) The purely contemplative life is certainly not the vocation of all. If culture is innocent and even useful, then, like permanent waving, it can be done to the Lord.

I find this distinction between (*a*) and (*b*) difficult, perhaps because I have not had the experience which Mr Lewis several times refers to as his "conversion." Whatever in the past may have been seriously necessary to "convert" my thoughts and passions and will from a self-centred to a God-centred or good-centred astronomy is seriously necessary still. I cannot "rest" on my oars and "play" with the *Divine Comedy* or *King Lear* or even with Shakespeare's Sonnets or with Sappho, any more than I can "play" with theology or philosophy or politics. The suggestion seems to me mildly blasphemous.

This, of course, leads us to the crux of the matter. Mr Lewis's basic distinction is between "salvation in Christ and glorifying God" (which he calls supernature) on the one hand, and what he calls nature on the other. And he

[1] One of the ways in which culture is said to do this is by showing us that "reality is very odd and that the ultimate truth, whatever it may be, *must* be something that would seem remote and fantastic to the uncultured." This seems dangerous doctrine. I certainly am no scholastic, but I think I understand why Mr Lewis confesses to being "a very poor Thomist." I doubt if the Angelic Doctor would have approved a propædeutic which would point at least as well to Satanism or Astrology.

remarks, with obvious truth, that " fine taste in the arts is not a condition of salvation " and that it is " to be abandoned without mercy the moment it conflicts with the service of God." But did he, even before his conversion, think all good artists were good men, or that you might continue your piano practice while your sick neighbour needed sleep? Is there *any* action we might not have to " abandon without mercy " if it " conflicted with the service of God "? The doctor must leave his devotions to save the dying man; the priest and congregation must turn out to extinguish the burning hospital. What *is* " glorifying God "? The one explicit answer given is that " our only means to glorifying Him is the salvation of human souls." But how do we save them? By inducing them to glorify God, that is to save others. And so on. That this criticism is no mere logic-chopping is shown by Mr Lewis's own inconsistencies. He does after all think that a charwoman's work " can be done to the Lord " though it is not the salvation of souls. And he cites with approval the Baptist's advice that men should " obey the moral law—as they had presumably learned it from their mothers and nurses " (who presumably were not Christians !).

Now, of course, it is absurd to suggest that the " moral law " has been adequately conveyed to us by our mothers and nurses. My nurse instructed me, on pretty much the same level, to obey her, to tell the truth, to be kind, not to play on Sunday, that women must not smoke, that I must go to church in my best clothes, and (though here my mother differed) that " Sunday " ought really to be kept on " Saturday." But, apart from that, how can " obedience to the moral law," as, for instance, paying my debts and healing the sick, be identified with " the salvation of human souls "?

Is it not the fact, and would not Mr Lewis really agree, that the " one condition of salvation " is obedience to conscience, the honest determination to find out what our duties are and to perform them? Could we " glorify God " by doing what we thought wrong? And if this be true, does not his difficulty resolve itself to an ordinary question of casuistry: " When and in what circumstances ought I to leave off writing, or reading *Hamlet*, or studying historical theology, in order to sweep the room, or to preach, or to reform the constitution ?"

Mr Lewis commits himself, rather easily perhaps, to the

unqualified assertion that pleasure is without doubt " in itself a good and pain in itself an evil." If this is so (as distinct from our liking one and disliking the other) God must know it, and one way of pleasing or glorifying Him will be to promote that good pleasure. But is it less certain that some kinds of knowledge—scientific, historical, theological, philosophical, and not least that knowledge of the human heart which we get in art—are good too? If I had the choice whether to write the Ninth Symphony or to do a really good spring-cleaning, I should in normal circumstances have little doubt of my duty. That, of course, would not make me a better man than the conscientious charwoman. Mr Lewis says: " Culture is a storehouse of the best sub-Christian virtues. These values are in themselves of the soul, not the spirit." I am not psychologist enough to grasp fully this distinction. But what are the " Christian virtues "? Not justice, truthfulness, benevolence, temperance, courage, for these are not necessarily directed to " the salvation of human souls " and so are only the splendid vices of the heathen.

I think that by " values of the soul " Mr Lewis really must mean what has also been called " the only unconditionally good thing, the good will "—what I have called conscientiousness. That is to say, I can best, and indeed only, glorify God by doing my duty, which would include, if that is possible, helping others to do theirs. And among my duties may be the production of whatever is good; for, if it is really good, it is good in God's sight. And is not æsthetic experience good? Where on earth is the " contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Literature of sinful man "? What else is the Old Testament? To know the human heart, even to sympathize with all its ecstasies and temptations and weaknesses and agonies and rebellions, may, like " the religious life " itself, have its dangers. It is certainly not self-indulgence. Conduct is not, as Arnold said, three-fourths of life, but the whole. But then, art is part of conduct. Is that the whole of Mr Lewis's quarrel with him?

E. F. Carritt.

P.S.—I am advised by experts that, if Mr Lewis really wants authority, he might try Cyril of Alexandria and John of Salisbury. Thomas More and Gerald Manley Hopkins suggest themselves as modern instances.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Mr Raby is a medievalist, who has written on the history of the religious and the secular Latin poetry of the Middle Ages.

The Rev. H. StJ. Hart is Fellow and Chaplain of Queens' College, Cambridge. His article is a revision and fusion of two sermons, the one preached in St Benet's Church, Cambridge, on the occasion of Mere's Commemoration, April 18, 1939, the other in Queens' College Chapel on the following Sunday.

The Rev. C. F. Rogers is Professor Emeritus of Pastoral Theology at King's College, London.

The Rev. D. M. Paton is one of the National Secretaries of the Student Division of the Y.M.C.A. of China.

Mr Bethell is Assistant Lecturer in English Language and Literature in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire.

Mr Carritt is a Fellow of University College, Oxford.

Dr Cross is a Librarian of Pusey House, Oxford.

The Rev. E. G. Parrinder is Principal of the Porto Novo Seminary, Dahomey, French West Africa.

NOTES

We have received the syllabus of the Church Union Summer School of Sociology which is to be held at Oxford from July 22 to 26. It is entitled *The English Situation* (price 6d., published by Church Social Action, 238, Abbey House, S.W.1). The speakers at the School will include Mr T. S. Eliot and Mr J. Middleton Murry. The syllabus should prove of value even to those who cannot hope to be present at the school.

The Oxford University Press has published a new altar book, *Altar Services*, which contains the order of Holy Communion (1662) with the alternative order from the book of 1928. It is printed in very fine and large type and in various editions. See prospectus, obtainable from the Oxford University Press.

CELLS IN ACTION

Some two years ago two or three young business men, who live in the diocese of Chester, approached the bishop asking for advice, as they thought that they and their friends had a contribution to make in view of the world situation; but they felt that this contribution could not best be made through the existing channels of institutional religion. For they felt that,

whilst they were men of good will and thought that Christianity was the only solution to world problems, they could not honestly subscribe to the Church's belief or system. They represent in fact a large section of the community. The result was that two groups or cells were formed of these young married public-school type of business men. Each group numbered from eight to ten. To each group a padre was allotted by the bishop. But the groups were to be essentially lay groups; the initiative and leadership was to be in the hands of the laymen and not in those of the padre. The latter was there as friend, with his own contribution to make as and when it was asked for. He had no special position by virtue of his office or experience. In other words he was to take a back seat, to listen rather than to talk, to serve rather than to dominate.

The two groups or cells met in each other's houses for eighteen months, up to the outbreak of war, when many of the members joined the forces. They met once a month. The host of the evening was responsible for leading off on the subject chosen for discussion, often by reading a paper or else by just giving a talk. The whole thing was completely informal, and, though notes were taken by one member, there was no chairman and no kind of organization. The group to which I was attached became a very real family in the course of several months. We had in our membership a doctor, two solicitors, a cotton merchant, a teacher and so on. Difficulties over such subjects as prayer (in theory and practice), sex, the place of the Church in life, the nature and being of God, the Divinity of our Lord and the inevitable problem of evil were discussed. We also considered what contribution we could make to the life of the community. A " daughter " group was formed of friends of the members. Every six months we met the bishop and reported progress.

The results were marked and interesting. At the start the majority of the group were either agnostic or non-practising Christians. After some six months all the members, except one, decided to put their lives on to a Christian basis. The group also made a corporate Communion together on the suggestion of a lay member, who confessed that he had not been to Communion since he left his public school. Does this suggest that Communion is the culmination of fellowship ?

Had the war not intervened we had hopes of honeycombing the diocese with such cells. The geographical basis was that of area rather than parish.

Perhaps the most delightful experience of our times together was the fellowship and real friendship which sprang up between us all, so much so that English reserve was at length broken down and we talked freely about our deepest difficulties and problems.

I think it is nothing more than the truth to say that often we experienced the quiet presence of Christ in our midst as we sat together in the twilight round the fire; and, as one member put

it, the group or cell had made the whole difference to his life and he did not know what he would do without it.

Perhaps the padre learned most of all, sitting as a learner among learners and as a friend among men of goodwill; and he at length had his opportunity when the group decided to ask him to give them four talks on " What the Church believes." Surely there are immense possibilities in such an experiment ?

But the initiative must come from the laity; it is not another of the vicar's organizations to be " given out " in the notices on Sunday !

RONALD SINCLAIR.

THE ORGANIC CONCEPTION OF THE CHURCH AND REUNION

" IN speaking of the Church," wrote the late Lord Halifax in 1912, " I think Roman Catholics have often in mind its exterior organisation and government, rather than the Church as the mystical Body of Christ. Members of the Church of England, on the other hand, when they speak of the Church, have almost always in view the Church, not as it is determined by its outward organisation, but as it is composed of those who are sacramentally united to Christ. Both ideas are involved in the conception of the Church, but the dwelling upon the one rather than the other is, I am sure, a fruitful source of misunderstanding " (*Leo XIII and Anglican Orders*, p. 399). The remark is one more example of the theological acumen of its author, which so often enabled him to penetrate in a single phrase to the heart of a problem and, as in this case, to utter prophetic words. For these were penned before the renewed interest in the doctrine of the Mystical Body, which is one of the outstanding features of Roman Catholic theology to-day, was apparent, and yet they indicated with uncanny precision the effect which this revival would have upon the problem of reunion.

A proof of this is to be seen in the last number of *The Eastern Churches Quarterly* (Vol. IV., No. 1, January, 1940). This well edited and always interesting Roman periodical (publishers, Geo. E. J. Coldwell, Ltd), which deserves to be better known among Anglicans, publishes on pp. 23-25 a remarkable document emanating from Mgr Neveu, the Roman Catholic Administrator Apostolic of Moscow, at present residing in Paris, which takes the form of an appeal to priests serving in the French Army regarding Eastern Orthodox soldiers they may happen upon at the front. (No doubt the many Orthodox refugees who have been mobilized are chiefly in view.) The soldier priests are urged to regard such as Catholics by intention. " When it happens to you, dear priests, to meet one of these Christians of good faith, who has recourse to your ministry, because he sincerely looks up to you as the priests of Jesus Christ, be sure of this:

here is an involuntary victim of the divisions brought on the Church by the fault of men. . . . Hence, dear soldier-priests, you have only to deal with a man who has recourse to your ministry as you would deal with a Catholic and brother in the faith." It is clear from the general tone of the appeal that the Administrator has in view almost exclusively *dying* Orthodox soldiers, and it is well known that in the case of the dying it is the normal practice of Rome to administer the sacraments with some freedom to those who would ordinarily be refused them. Moreover, Mgr Neveu urges those to whom he appeals to get the dying Orthodox " to make an act of faith as explicitly as possible in the authority of the visible head of the Church," as well as to ascertain or assume his good faith. So, unnecessarily far-reaching conclusions, as that Rome has wholly revised her outlook, should not be drawn from this appeal. Nevertheless, the document, apart from the interest of its practical directions, is most significant because of the principle upon which those directions are based. This is expressed thus: " In virtue of his baptism, every Orthodox becomes a member of the One and Universal Church. He therefore belongs *de jure* to the Catholic Church as long as he does not commit a formal act of schism. . . . When I am in the presence of an Orthodox Christian, I know that there are nine presumptions against one that this Christian has not committed the sin of schism." From this it is argued, by detailed appeal to Roman canon law, that such a person has incurred no excommunication. " Who tells me that millions and millions of Oriental Christians, involuntarily severed from Rome, are but a mass of excommunicated people ?" The point is reinforced by reference to an instance of Pius XI's giving his blessing to " a pious Russian bishop, then still Orthodox, saying that he considered him his son." " The Holy Father, Pius XI, . . . who exactly knew the extent of his duties and rights, would certainly not have given his blessing to excommunicated people in a state of mortal sin."

Such an attitude *vis-à-vis* the Orthodox is not wholly novel. In Lord Halifax's book quoted above an example will be found of a similar doctrine defended by a Jesuit at the Velehrad Congress of 1907 (p. 400, footnote). What is of interest is that it should be reaffirmed so strongly at this time by one in authority, with very definite and immediate practical conclusions. And the same number of *The Eastern Churches Quarterly* contains something of even more interest to members of the Church of England. The editor, Dom Bede Winslow, O.S.B., in the first of a series of articles on " The Liturgy and Reunion," draws attention to Mgr Neveu's pronouncement and approves it. " The point we want to make is this attitude of accepting the status of our fellow Christian because of his baptism " (p. 3). A footnote to this sentence quotes without comment the matter and form of baptism provided in the Book of Common Prayer and indicates

at the least a desire to examine the bearing of the principle upon the status of Anglicans. It is significant that this occurs in an article concerned with the bearing of the Liturgical Movement upon the question of reunion, for the Liturgical Movement is intimately related in present-day theological thought with the organic conception of the Church involved in the doctrine of the Mystical Body. And that doctrine is too much bound up with general modern currents of both Christian and secular thought to be merely an ephemeral theological *snobisme* or fashion. Its importance can scarcely be overestimated. As we have indicated, and as Lord Halifax saw long ago, it is the one thing which, by modifying the exclusively juridical view of the Church, can give a truer balance to ecclesiology and deliver us from the tendency to think of the Church almost exclusively in terms drawn by analogy from the secular state, a tendency which has warped theology and practice alike ever since the conversion of Constantine introduced it into Christian thought and the tradition of feudal prelacy in the Dark Ages riveted it upon canonists and theologians.

THOMAS M. PARKER.

COMMENT ON LITERARY PERIODICALS

THIS quarter's comments continue the theme of Mr Jarrett-Kerr's February commentary. *The Idea of a Christian Society* is still being discussed, not only in *The Christian News-Letter* and *The Resurrection of Christendom*, but by Fr Peck in *Christendom*[1] (with a combination of distant respect and, I think, the acerbity of misunderstanding), by the Rev. Henry Swabey in *The Townsman*,[2] by the present writer (and, by implication, Mr Herbert Read) in the March number of *Purpose*.[3] Mr Harding's review in the December *Scrutiny*[4] has produced a pained protest against " history according to J. M. Robertson and Joseph McCabe " from Mr James Smith. But to Mr Smith's charge that Mr Harding's " exploration " means no more than " the itch for adventure and the love of novelty " Mr Harding can reply with complete conviction, " It doesn't." I think the liberal wing of *Scrutiny* gets the best of this encounter. In the same (March, 1940) number Mr Turnell has an article on Racine's " Athalie " which is not without relation to Mr Eliot's concern, his theme, and his mood: " The new order is somehow unreal and its very unreality seems to reflect the poet's own disillusionment and the defeat of his hopes. I think we must conclude that Racine had come to feel that his great hope—the creation of a truly Christian society on the ruins of the society analysed in the secular plays by a synthesis of all the disparate elements—was not destined to

[1] Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 2s. [2] West Mill, Morwenstow, N. Cornwall, 1s. [3] C. W. Daniel Co., 40, Great Russell Street, W.C.1, 1s. [4] Deighton, Bell and Co., Cambridge, 2s. 6d.

be realized. The history of the past hundred and fifty years has abundantly justified his pessimism." Mr Eliot, like Racine, has a more precise vision of evil than of good, and Mr Turnell has sometimes assailed his vagueness with a strange and rather sectarian bitterness. But we ought to be thankful that his faith is so stubborn in darkness,

> " Not the intense moment
> Isolated, with no before and after,
> But a lifetime burning in every moment."

" You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy." This is the theme of " East Coker," a new long poem which was published in *The New English Weekly* in Holy Week, on March 21. It has not the mathematical perfection of " Burnt Norton," and some people will say that no poem can be a success which contains two confessions of failure. But, like " Ash Wednesday," it is a translation of spiritual experience into physical sensation. And very much more is translated than ten years ago. I hope it will soon be more generally available.

The February *Townsman* contains the rest of Ronald Duncan's miracle play " Within the Order of the Mass," which some church ought to produce. There may be more than a touch of Buddhism in the Sanctus, but how much more than a touch of hedonism there is in many nativity plays ! His brief editorial proposes a rule of life, which has rather too much to do with how you invest your money if you have any. But not to buy " Fifty shilling suits or fifty-seven varieties " is certainly on the right lines.

Mr Duncan doesn't approve of *Horizon*,[1] nor do I much. But the March number was notable for one very good article by George Orwell on penny dreadfuls, containing the results of much intelligent research into a significant subject of great importance for curates. I understand that this has been reprinted.[2]

Purpose becomes more and more theological. In December, 1939, Philip Mairet wrote on Kierkegaard and Mr Delmore Schwartz contributed a useful history of *The Criterion*. In March, 1940, Mr Arthur Prior discovers a poetic supralapsarian in eighteenth-century Scotland. Mr Herbert Read thinks it necessary to explain why " belief in a supernatural order requires a high degree of intellectual effort." The lay mind, he thinks, cannot possibly see through the " front of . . . credibility and logicality " supplied by the " knowledge " which persuades us that there is no answer to the question, " What is the end of Man ?" Therefore a neutral society is inevitable, " whatever from the philosophical point of view may be desirable." Mr George Barker contributes what I think is a very good poem.

GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M.

[1] 6, Selwyn House, Lansdowne Terrace, W.C.1, 1s. [2] In *Inside the Whale* (Gollancz, 7s. 6d.).

SURVEYS

(A) PHILOSOPHY

The return to a strictly theological understanding of Reality, which under the pressure of contemporary events is forcing itself on the Church, raises anew the problem of the relation of the Christian faith to philosophy. That there is a rightful place in the Evangelical scheme of things for a reasoned metaphysic has been continuously recognized by the main stream of Christian tradition. Even Tertullian, who could on occasion burst into fierce denunciation of philosophy and ask what could be the connexion between Jerusalem and Athens, showed in his calmer moments his capacity for making abundant use of philosophy for apologetic purposes, and could even refer to Seneca as *sæpe noster*. But it has also been recognized by the consciousness of Christendom that philosophy can never have the last word. Its position can never be more than that of a subject to the *regina scientiarum*. This consciousness is the intellectual counterpart of the primacy of the being of God over that of man, and fixes the limits within which the relation of reason to faith for the Christian theologian must lie.

The exact nature of this relation, however, has constantly exercised the minds of Christian thinkers and, as those who follow the course of French theological discussion will be well aware, has been vigorously and acutely discussed on the other side of the Channel through the fresh posing of the problem by the publication in 1927 of M. Emile Bréhier's volume on the *History of Medieval Philosophy*. The vast literature which the controversy has evoked may be studied in the very useful survey of it by Fr B. Baudoux in the issue of *Antonianum* for October, 1936, where between sixty and seventy items are listed. Hitherto, however, there has been little attention paid to the controversy in its contemporary phase in Great Britain, and for this reason the discussion of it in several of Father James's essays in his volume *Christian Philosophy* (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 6s.) is certain of a welcome. The author, who is well known to English students of scholasticism as Dr James E. O'Mahony from his earlier book on *The Desire of God in the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas* (1929) and as the translator into English of Père Rousselot's *L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas*, is a Capuchin Friar, a fact which no doubt explains his sympathies with the Augustinian tradition and his somewhat critical attitude to the doctrines of M. Maritain. While insisting on the necessary subordination of philosophy to theology, he goes far towards denying the existence of a hard-and-fast line between them. A further indication of Fr James's sympathies may perhaps be seen in his references to "*St* Clement of Alexandria," despite the fact that Benedict XIV removed his name in 1748 from the

Roman Martyrology. Even where the essays fail to win assent, they will be found indubitably stimulating.

From Father James's discussions, the most fundamental of all living issues, that of transcendence, is never far off. The answer given to it almost determines the significance of any particular thinker for contemporary theology. It shows, to name two recent books at random which, it is understood, are to be reviewed elsewhere in THEOLOGY, the supreme relevance of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns's volumes on the *Fourth Gospel* and the irrelevance of Dr A. C. Bradley's Gifford Lectures (delivered in 1907). Into the latter category the theologian must place Dr W. M. Urban's treatise on *Language and Reality* (Allen and Unwin, 21s.). It contains, as its title and dimensions would lead the reader to expect, a good deal of discussion of the problems connected with the use of language, about which so much has been said in recent analytical philosophy; but the treatment of these questions stands too much outside the terms in which the language-problem is posed by Logical Positivists to make a contribution which those who accept such doctrines will be likely to appreciate. The sections of the book which deal with "religion" suffer from being completely under the dominance of the tradition which derives from Schleiermacher. Religion is a form of experience which uses symbols in a similar way to that in which poetry uses them. Hence "the philosophy of religion investigates the nature of religion as a symbolic form and the validity of its symbols as a representation of reality. It seeks, therefore, to determine the meaning and the validity of what religion says both explicitly and implicitly" (p. 616). The attempt to find support for such a symbolic understanding of the Christian faith on the ground that "in Christian theology the creed as a whole is called a symbol" (pp. 618*f.*) rests on a failure to perceive that the word *symbolum* has been used in Christian dogmatics in a quite definite technical sense from the time of Cyprian onwards.

Of the Rev. J. V. L. Casserley's "Signpost" on *The Fate of Modern Culture* (Dacre Press, 1s.) it is difficult to write without indulging in a series of superlatives. It is not that Mr Casserley has any particularly novel doctrines to propound. On the contrary, he is convinced that the desperate state of culture to-day is the expression of too much novelty and that it is in the reaffirmation of the traditional faith and metaphysic of the Christian Church that salvation lies. The excellence of Mr Casserley's pages consists in his brilliant and trenchant analysis of contemporary culture in the light of that faith. Perhaps the striking cover of the series of which this volume is the first instalment was devised to suggest the "Signpostmen's" conviction that the faith in its relation to the world is to be understood in terms of "black and white." Certainly this belief adds greatly to the effectiveness of Mr Casserley's presentation of his case, which

is the fruit of his own personal experience. " He was brought up," so we are told in the brief objective biographies of the " Signpostmen " on the back cover, " under Rationalist influence; he was first interested in theology by reading an attack on Christianity."

The book's format will no doubt challenge comparison with the " Penguins," now seen on every bookstall. It is their equal in brilliance; but the comparison also reveals with startling clarity how a transcendent faith succeeds where secular analyses fail. For however vividly it may be possible to paint the events of recent years in secularist terms, when it comes to teleological considerations even on the secular level (*e.g.*, the definition of " war aims ") immanental explanations completely break down. It would no doubt be unfair to ascribe to the majority of the secularist writers and readers of the " Penguins " the faith which the publishers profess in a note prefixed to one of their recent volumes: " The publishers of Penguin Books have no interest in furthering the cause of any particular group or party." But it is becoming increasingly clear that an immanentist faith is quite impossible. Mr Casserley rests his case on the futility of all attempts to extricate contemporary culture from within civilization itself; and if few things appear to be further from his purpose than to provide a transcendental basis for " war aims," he shows at least that he is fully aware that only in terms of a faith which is beyond culture can the issue be intelligently posed. If present events awaken a spirit of self-criticism in our age, the book will undoubtedly receive a large circulation.

A valuable contribution to Spinozistic studies has just appeared in the late Professor H. H. Joachim's *Spinoza's Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* (Clarendon Press, 16s.). Since 1901, when Joachim published his volume on the *Ethics*, he has been widely known to possess an expert understanding of Spinoza, and the present book is the outcome of several years' distinguished and delicate scholarship. Only seldom have the treatises other than the *Ethics* received close attention, and never before, it would appear, has the " Essay on the Purification of the Intellect " received detailed handling from an English scholar. The short treatise, which, as Joachim observes, Spinoza never finished owing to the philosophical difficulties in which its argument had involved him, was written in 1661-2, and first published shortly after Spinoza's death in 1677. Many readers will regret that the Latin text of the *Tractatus*, which is not too easily accessible, was not included in the volume, especially as Joachim shows that it is sometimes possible to emend the current Latin text from the contemporaneously published Dutch version, which was based on a different MS (or MSS ?) from that used for the printing of the Latin text of 1677.

Professor Joachim believes that there must always be some

uncertainty as to Spinoza's analysis of knowledge in the *Tractatus* on account of its unfinished condition. He is clear, however, that Spinoza is endeavouring to carry to a further stage the problem as it was formulated by Descartes, and he gives an extended analysis of what Spinoza achieved. He does not refrain, however, from indicating where he believes Spinoza's positions to be indefensible, nor does he hesitate, from his own Hegelian standpoint, to develop the doctrines which he conceives Spinoza to have expounded.

Like the *Tractatus*, this commentary is itself a *torso*. Its publication was supervised by Mrs Elizabeth Joachim and the Provost of Oriel.

Among other recent books which may be noticed are Dr L. A. Reid's *Preface to Faith* (Allen and Unwin, 6s.), Professor R. Simeterre's *La Théorie Socratique de la Vertu-Science selon les "Mémorables" de Xénophon* (Paris, Téqui, frs. 15), and M. M. Ahmad, *Die Verwirklichung des Summum Bonum in der religiösen Erfahrung* (Munich, E. Reinhardt, RM. 4.80). Dr Reid, as a friendly outsider, puts a number of questions to Christian apologists, as well as making some *essais* in theological construction. He seeks, *e.g.*, to show the possibility of throwing light on the problem of Christology from considerations drawn from æsthetic theory. The book will impress every reader by its obvious sincerity. The interest of the other two books named is likely to be confined to specialists. Dr Simeterre disputes the thesis of J. Burnet and Professor A. E. Taylor that the Platonic *Dialogues* give a reliable account of Socrates as an historic figure, and thus insists that the primary source for Socrates' ethical doctrines must be sought in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. Dr Ahmad, who was a pupil of Dr Friedrich Heiler of Marburg, has treated his subject from the standpoint of "comparative religion."

F. L. Cross.

(B) PRESENT THEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN FRENCH PROTESTANTISM

Three years after Napoleon Bonaparte came to power he placed the Reformed Churches under the protection of the State, salaried their ministers and controlled the theological faculties. This tutelage did much to stifle progress; the national synods were suppressed for seventy years, and pastors were condemned to prison for proselytism. Thus the spiritual and intellectual life of the Churches which had managed to survive the terrible persecutions of Louis XIV and the Revolution was still greatly restricted under the Bonapartist régime. Just before the middle of last century the "Revival" (of Swiss and English Methodist inspiration) did much to renew the zeal of the faithful. Never-

theless, the Revival was strongly biblical and literalist, it had little sympathy with liturgical reform or modernist criticism, and when liberal thought was introduced from Germany there was a great outcry. The orthodox were naturally fearful of anything that would weaken their position before the State, but their zeal easily turned to persecuting. When their first Synod was permitted in 1872 they endeavoured to introduce and impose a Confession of Faith, and thus was produced the lamentable schism which split the Church into Reformed (liberals, about 200 churches) and Reformed Evangelicals (orthodox, 400 churches). This division has only recently been healed (in 1939), due partly to the growth of a more tolerant spirit, but partly also to the financial stringency which has become ever greater since the separation of the Churches from the State in 1905.

Theological thought up to 1914 followed, in the main, the two great divisions, liberal or conservative. During the last twenty years, however, there have been two surprising developments. There has been a most unexpected revival of Calvinism, due in part to the influence of Karl Barth. There is also a small but growing movement seeking liturgical reform, of æsthetic inspiration—an almost unheard-of development in France, where Protestantism has always been reactionary in this respect, because overshadowed by its powerful rival Roman Catholicism.

Liberal religious study has progressed in France in the last two decades, although it has had to yield pride of place to the neo-Calvinist school. This latter fact has probably occurred because modernism in France has, so far, been almost entirely biblical. Some excellent critical work has been done in recent years despite the decline of German criticism. But biblical criticism is very often negative, perhaps almost of necessity; and there has been a lack of theological teaching, sufficiently thorough, which would enable students to build upon a sounder foundation than in the past. In the absence of a constructive theology criticism is becoming neglected in favour of a return to Calvin. The few who try to combine the two are almost pathetic in their efforts to find traces of the critical method in Calvin !

Of the theological faculties, two, Paris and Strasbourg, have been, and are still to a certain extent, strongholds of modernism. The third, Montpellier, is more orthodox and evangelical and the least scholarly, though not necessarily obscurantist. The Dean of the Faculty of Paris, Maurice Goguel, is well known as the author of a number of first-class New Testament studies. His *Life of Jesus* is translated into English, and is a most careful and scholarly work. His second volume, *La Foi à la Résurrection de Jésus dans le Christianisme primitif*, is probably even more important in view of the scarcity of works on this subject. Goguel holds that " the Gospel is, in reality, founded, not on the life and teaching of Jesus, but on his death and resurrection " (p. 46); therefore he submits all the records, the

Gospels and Pauline and Johannine theologizings, to a tsom thorough scrutiny in order to discover the facts upon which the resurrection-faith was founded. Later Christophanies in Church history are selected for comparison, and psychological elements are examined. Goguel concludes that the story of the empty tomb was a later rationalizing explanation, the early preaching did not refer to it, the sepulchre never became a place of pilgrimage, the body of Jesus was hurriedly buried by the Jews in some cavity and no one bothered about its location (pp. 154 and 204). He will have nothing to do with hypotheses of " objective visions " based upon some theory of an astral or discarnate body; such are " des hypothèses désespérées." He smites equally the " natural " explanations that supposed a stealing of the body or mere apparent death; likewise the influence of solar myths is discounted. Some of the disciples had visions, probably in Galilee, and we are left with the impression that they were self-induced, though it is not suggested that there was any conscious deception.

Also at Paris is Adolphe Lods, a great Old Testament scholar; two of his works are in English and are as good as anything we have : *Israel from its Beginnings to the Eighth Century* and *The Prophets and the Beginnings of Judaism.* Professor Lods' treatment is objective, but his spiritual perception is deep, and he is greatly appreciated even by Calvinists. At Strasbourg Jean Héring has written a number of important works on the Old Testament; while the *Recherches Théologiques* issued from time to time by the faculty (publ. Alcan) is the most considerable series in French Protestantism; F. Ménégoz has had some valuable essays in this review on the Resurrection and " illusion " in the expectations of Jesus. A composite work by scholars of all grades of thought, yet generally moderate in outlook, is the *Dictionnaire encyclopédique de la Bible* in two volumes, edited by the veteran A. Westphal, somewhat similar to Hastings' one-volume dictionary.

Two other outstanding scholars can hardly be classed as Protestants, but they have a widespread influence. C. Guignebert has continued Lods' volumes with *The Jewish World in the Time of Jesus.* His *Jesus* is also in English; he refutes the mythological explanation of Christianity, and suggests that at the Resurrection Peter may have had a visual hallucination, but the expectant state in which he lived may have caused his vision by misinterpreting some visual phenomenon. Alfred Loisy is famed as an ex-priest who has gradually broken farther and farther away from organized religion; he is not now even a theist, though far from being a vulgar rationalist. Of his many works probably the last gives the best sketch of his opinions, *La Naissance du Christianisme.* He is more arbitrary than M. Goguel, but he has some penetrating flashes of insight that are often helpful, however much we may disagree with his general position.

The revival of Calvinism is one of the most considerable movements of continental theology (see Clavier, *Etudes sur le Calvinisme*). For many years the venerable Dean Emile Doumergue laboured at his lifework, the works of Calvin in seven huge volumes; but doubtless he considered himself to be a survival of the past, and his tomes destined to be stored on the top shelves of college libraries. But, instead of this, the last ten years have seen an outburst of the influence of Calvin. His *Institutes*, long out of print in French, have been republished, there have been reprints of smaller works and commentaries, and innumerable studies of his life and thought. Karl Barth's reaction against liberalism is certainly more potent on the Continent than in England, and there the influence of the Reformers has also always been much stronger.

At Paris the prophet of Calvinism is Auguste Lecerf, author of *Introduction à la dogmatique réformée*, of which the two first volumes to appear have treated of the nature and foundation of religious knowledge. Lecerf is no pupil of Doumergue, but there is not a great deal of difference between his neo-Calvinism and the rigid orthodoxy of the grand old man; he is for ever harking back to the sacred texts of Geneva. While appreciating Lods, he cannot agree with Goguel, and students have to take sides between the two. Other types of Calvinism descend by degrees to the virulent " théopneustiste " literalist evangelists of the Brigade de la Drôme in the south. It is certain that neo-Calvinism has had a stimulating effect on faith and preaching; the prophetic note has largely replaced the scholarly query. It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that French logic will not lead to the complete neglect of all scientific religious study.

The transition from neo-Calvinism to liturgical study is not violent, because there has been a renewed interest in reformed doctrine on worship and the sacraments. We may note Benoît's study on " Calvin et le Baptême des Enfants " (*Recherches Théologiques*, 1937), and, in particular, Jean Cadier of Montpellier on " La Présence réelle dans le Calvinisme " in the *Montpellier Review* (November, 1938). Cadier puts forth Calvin's doctrine as mediating between the eucharistic views of Zwingli and Luther, and therefore hopes that it might also serve as a basis for reunion discussions to-day. Calvin holds, with Zwingli, that Christ's material body is localized in heaven; it cannot be ubiquitous, as Luther had said, for that would destroy the possibility of a physical Second Coming. Yet the communicant at the altar feeds on the flesh of Christ by the virtue of the Holy Spirit.

Most significantly a volume appeared from Paris last year, in which Lecerf, Lods, Goguel and others co-operated, on the Origin and Nature of the Church. This is studied historically in Judaism, New Testament, Middle Ages, Luther and Calvin. Professors R. Will and F. Ménégoz of Strasbourg have also issued

volumes of international importance, the latter on *Le Problème de la Prière*, and the former with three monumental tomes on *Le Culte*. The peculiar problems of Protestant worship are vigorously treated in a little book on *L'Eglise*; A. N. Bertrand, writing on Adoration in Protestant Services, remonstrates against the Protestant temptation to identify worship with the sermon, and the danger of the sermon being just the opinions of some preacher, and thus all possibility of adoration being excluded; R. Will in *Disgrâce de nos Cultes Protestants* fulminates against the subjectivism and " abstraction spiritualiste " of the usual service, and asks why Protestants object to the crucifix, candles and vestments.

It may be noted that the ugliness of many Reformed Churches in the past, as in English Nonconformity, cannot always be attributed to insensitiveness to beauty, for there are signs of the æsthetic faculty in other directions, for example in hymnology. There were usually financial difficulties, there was reaction from gaudy Roman Catholicism, but there was also definite State compulsion to build churches no different from other houses or barns and down sidestreets. It is, of course, true that there has been an æsthetic awakening, as may be seen in numerous articles in popular reviews such as *Le Semeur* and *Foi et Vie*.

A most striking work is a book of devotions, *Livre de Prière des Veilleurs*, for a Protestant Third Order, inspired largely by the mystical Wilfred Monod. This is a breviary of private devotion; the word " breviary " is justified as not being in the custody of any particular clergy or Church. It is divided into three Offices for each day, entitled " Light," " Flame " and " Perfumes." The calendar of the Christian Year is followed; this is an innovation in French Protestantism outside the Lutheran Churches. Prayers are borrowed from many sources and languages, and not a few from the Roman liturgies, suitably emended.

This is hardly the place to touch on more philosophical Protestant thought, though it is often neglected in reviews of French philosophy. An excellent summary of most of the different views is to be found in Edmond Rochedieu's recent *La Personnalité Divine* (ed. Labor, Geneva). E. Monod has a long work of 3,000 pages on *Le Problème du Bien*, trying to reconcile evil and the goodness of God. It cannot be said that he has succeeded, or that his speculations are philosophically sound.

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate the main trends of contemporary French theological thought. Protestant scholarship is far from moribund in France, and we trust that with the recent Reunion it will work to new and more durable syntheses of the best in each school.

E. G. Parrinder.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RESURRECTION OF CHRISTENDOM. By J. H. Oldham.

EUROPE IN TRAVAIL. By J. Middleton Murry.

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE. By F. Clarke.

THE MESSAGE OF THE WORLD-WIDE CHURCH. By W. Paton.

(The Christian News-Letter Books: Sheldon Press. 1s. each.)

These cheap, well-produced small books, which appear under the general editorship of the Rev. A. R. Vidler, develop the lines of thought laid down in *The Churches survey their Task*. They assert, as Lord Eustace Percy asserted in an essay quoted by Dr Paton, that " the future of Europe depends upon the future of the Christian faith," and they recognize, as Mr Eliot recognized in his *Idea of a Christian Society*, that our present society is held together by Christian values which we still respect from force of habit.

Apart from vestigial Christian values (and it would be foolish to place a low estimate on their strength or their durability) we, as a society, believe in the " Rights of Man," and in man's innate tendency to self-improvement. We are also inclined to believe that the pursuit of material science will lead and help us to attain these rights and this self-improvement; and that knowledge of the material world, being more readily verified and reduced to order than the world of " value," is a distinct and separate region, more worthy of attention than the region of morality, æsthetics and religion. Perhaps also we are inclined to overlook the fact that the achievements of material science have greatly increased the pace of living: we can use up material resources, break up a social organization, eradicate a tradition or conduct a devastating war, faster than ever before—so much faster that the consequences of bad thinking in the field of " value," instead of being visited on the third and fourth generation, may well be visited on ourselves.

And it seems that much of our thinking is bad, not merely by Christian standards, but by more pragmatic tests. The liberal ideas of the nineteenth century—unimpeachable in the generosity of their aims—sometimes rested on false conceptions of man, as individual and as social being. " Democracy " is by no means a spectacular success: " the natural goodness of man " is almost counterbalanced by the natural evil. We have already reached a point at which the need for new social ideals of humility, unselfishness and conscientious work has become apparent. Mr Murry, himself once a believer in the " inner light " of romanticism and scientific humanism, admirably surveyed this social crisis in his broadcast talks, now reprinted as *Europe in Travail*, and he concludes that " Democracy as it

exists to-day is not a positive alternative to totalitarianism; for democracy as it exists to-day cannot last."

Mr Murry indicates some conditions for a new democracy. Dr Oldham in somewhat more detail states what he believes to be the Christian attitude to society. His points are so well put that they deserve to be quoted here, if only to give the quality of his clear and forceful writing:

1. *The Freedom and Responsibility of Persons.*—In the Christian view the end of all social activities and institutions is to contribute to the growth of free and responsible persons, realizing their vocations as sons of God and living in relations of mutual trust, obligation and service. . . .

2. *Tolerance.*—The Christian understanding of man as a created, finite being with limited powers is opposed to every attempt to give an absolute value to any one element in the temporal order. . . .

3. *Social Justice.*—. . . Only a society which is striving after new embodiments of justice demanded by the changing conditions of each age can aspire to the name of a new Christendom.

4. *A Pluralist Society.*—. . . A society which has as its objective the growth of free and responsible persons will aim at a wide diffusion of responsibility. . . .

5. *Reverence for Nature.*—The Christian understanding of the world as God's creation must beget a religious respect for nature. Men will regard the materials on which their labour is expended not merely as means of gratifying their desires but as possessing qualities to be understood, appreciated and loved. They will distinguish clearly between the use and the reckless exploitation of natural resources. . . .

6. *The Family.*—. . . Work and business engage only a part of the personality, but in the love of the family the whole man can find satisfaction. . . . The family . . . is a training-ground in responsibility and mutual obligation, and builds the dispositions which fit its members to participate in the wider life of the community.

7. *The Universal Church.*—. . . The Church is also the guardian of the truth that man as person has goals which reach beyond society, such as the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, skill and goodness. . . . The Christian Church, moreover, as a universal society transcends the bounds of nationality, and is in unalterable opposition to the deification of a human community. . . .

The whole of Dr Oldham's book deserves to be widely read and studied. Dr Paton starts from the same premisses and ranges over a wider field. To English and European Christians his discussion of the problems and achievements of the Church in China (and Japan) will be both salutary and encouraging. More insistently than Professor Clarke or Mr Murry, he bases his arguments on Christian principles:

First, that God is, and that He has in Jesus Christ acted decisively in history; second, that from this loving act of God there proceeds an understanding and valuation of man, based upon that act of grace; third, that the Christian message does not offer to a needy society pieces of idealism to be worked into a faulty structure, but the call to repent

and be " converted "; fourth, that the fellowship based upon this act of God has a unity which originates not in any common views or inherent identities in those who belong to it, but in that which they all in common owe to God. . . .

Professor Clarke's book says comparatively little about the part that the schools are playing in producing our " neutral " society and still less about the change in our conceptions of education that will be necessary if we are to build a Christian Society. Professor Clarke has some sympathy with those who believe " that the hope of a genuine common culture at a reasonably high level is more likely to be realized through the senior schools, the technical schools, and diverse facilities for adult education, than by a secondary school frustrated from one side by its out-of-date and out-of-place apeing of the old ' privileged ' tradition, and from another side by parental ambition which sees in the ' ladder ' steps not to Parnassus but to a secure job and a villa in Suburbia." The information about the history, traditional aims and present structure of English education so compactly offered by Professor Clarke calls for discussion in the light of other books in this promising series.

Speaking now, not as the detached reviewer trying to give a fair account of the books before him, but as an individual concerned with much the same problems as the authors, there is one question I want to raise. To whom are these books addressed ? Professor Clarke's book is not very closely bound to Christianity; Mr Murry argues the social necessity of Christianity in language that is not specifically Christian; Dr Oldham uses a Christian terminology but puts his plea for Christian sociology so cogently that it will appeal to many non-Christians; Dr Paton speaks plainly and unequivocally as a Christian thinking in Christian categories and talking to Christians.

In Mr Murry's writing, and to a less extent in Dr Oldham's, there is a faint element of pragmatism, a suggestion that Christianity will provide the only basis for a workable or acceptable society, *and is therefore true*. I am sure that this is not Dr Oldham's intention, and I doubt whether it is Mr Murry's. I am inclined to think that no harm need be done in putting the appeal of Christianity in this way; and indeed I can see no other basis on which a wide and convincing appeal could be made to-day. Truth is not the same thing as social convenience, but the truth is, in the end, socially convenient; and a truth apprehended in one way may ultimately be appreciated in another. I have some misgivings about this, for the religious appreciation of Christian doctrine would be lost if the pragmatic mode of apprehension were permanently accepted as the sole approach to truth—and I would gladly hear the views of Dr Oldham and Mr Murry.

MICHAEL ROBERTS.

Alexander Penrose Forbes, Bishop of Brechin: The Scottish Pusey. By William Perry. S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d.

Dr Perry might well complain that he has to make bricks without the usual allowance of straw. This is Bishop Forbes's Life, but not his Life and Letters. Strangely enough very few of the letters which he wrote seem to have been preserved, and most of those from others which he thought worth keeping were burnt by some hand unknown to the general public. Yet after reading the Life one is bound to reflect that literary bricks are often spoilt by too much of this kind of straw, and that you can make very good ones with very little. But alas for the Diary which also found its way to the flames !

This is a good biography. The author has not allowed his admiration for his subject to betray him either into writing at disproportionate length or into chronicling too much small beer. We finish the book with appetite for just a little more; and there are very few pages that we want to skip.

Even the first chapter is very readable, which is rare in biographies. Indeed, the author, like his hero, starts with the advantage that " the House of Forbes " is a remarkable family. We have heard before of most of its members and are glad to meet them again.

The second chapter is necessarily less interesting, however necessary, because it is the story of a false start. The decision to give up a secular career was not, it seems, absolutely final until a few days before Forbes's ordination to the diaconate at the age of twenty-seven, and the story of his life until shortly before that date seems set at a different angle from that of his true career. But the chapter is redeemed from any suspicion of dullness by the really lovely portrait of Forbes at the age of nineteen.

So we come to that meteoric ministry of only thirty-one years—one year as deacon, two as priest, twenty-eight as bishop. During his years as deacon and priest he held two curacies, one sole charge, and one incumbency. As bishop he built four large churches, founded a community, built their splendid chapel, acted both as bishop of the diocese and rector of the principal church in Dundee, proved himself tireless in pastoral ministration, a master of historical research, a profound theologian, a skilful controversialist. He was the author of thirty-two books, besides very many published articles and sermons. Most of this time he had wretched health, and it was made worse by the prolonged persecution to which he was subjected by the spiteful injustice of those who should have been his chief supporters. A direct result of this ill-health was the constant need during his latter years for long foreign holidays, a fact which makes his output of energy more stupendous still.

Dr Perry calls the bishop " the Scottish Pusey." This reads

somewhat oddly on the title-page, but it is a good title none the less. It may be hoped that as a result of the author's labours it will come to be realized that there is a real parallel between the tasks which these two great men were called to do for the Church. As breakers of new ground, as directors of souls, as sober enthusiasts, as scholars, as men who suffered for conscience' sake, as saviours of the Catholic tradition, they are strangely reminiscent of each other.

All this is well brought out by Dr Perry, who has laid the Church, especially in Scotland, under a very deep obligation by giving us this lively portrait of a very great man. One of the most enlivening things about the book is the illustrations. Forbes made a good picture. But how he burnt himself up! Just compare the golden youth of nineteen with the Bishop's splendid maturity at forty-seven and the black cinder which he had become at fifty-five. There are more ways than one of being a martyr.

Here are a few trifling *corrigenda*.

On p. 13, 1843 is obviously a misprint for 1833.

On pp. 60, 61, there is an omission which is responsible for some confusion. Forbes is quoted, quite correctly, as protesting against the suggestion that a hierarchy of the Roman obedience was to be set up in Scotland. But he is further quoted as writing to his clergy to say that we could *with an ill grace* protest against such an act. The explanation appears to be that in the second quotation the words " except on the ecclesiastical grounds on which we protested " have been omitted. When they are restored the protest and the letter are consistent with each other.

There are some little inaccuracies in the last paragraph of the book. Actually Forbes Court (a very small house in those days) was bought, not specially built; the original plan of the committee was to provide a residence (with a chapel as Dr Perry states) and a memorial window in the cathedral. The recumbent statue was afterwards substituted for the window. But it is not a " tomb " that it rests upon, but a cenotaph. The relics of my great and holy predecessor lie in the rock under the memorial brass.

✠ Kenneth Brechin.

Begin Here, a War-Time Essay. By Dorothy L. Sayers. Gollancz. 6s.

I hope that admirers of Miss Sayers who read this book will pay particular attention to her criticisms of the reading public which begin on pp. 17, 116, and 153. Hostile critics would be well advised to get the book out of a library and examine

these references, and I think they may find that though she naturally differs from them in her general estimate of her own work, she is on their side as against those who prefer Miss Dorothy Sayers to Mrs Woolf (or John Steinbeck, or William Faulkner) on the ground that she better satisfies their craving for a life that is ethically and emotionally simpler. To prefer Miss Sayers to (shall we say) Miss Agatha Christie on the ground that we like our detection best when it is diluted with the manner of another style of fiction is quite a different kind of judgment, though the present reviewer happens to differ from both and prefers his detection, when he has it, neat. Miss Sayers definitely disapproves of thrillers as a class. She anathematizes our attempt to " escape from our own feelings into an unreal world where we sit passively while the professionally manufactured emotions of phantoms are, as it were, poured over and into us without stirring us to activity " (p. 18).

Miss Sayers is also severe upon secretaries of societies who say to her, " our people won't mind what you talk about; they only want to see you." She rightly says that this is " a damnable insult to the lecturer, to the subject, and to human reason." Why then did she write this book, since she confesses that outside the fields of drama and the novel she is an amateur? She says on p. 132 that the writer of fiction is " the specialized representative, as it were, of amateur opinion. He can speak for the man-in-the-street, because he is himself the man-in-the-street with a better training in the art of putting ideas on paper." It is a modest claim, and in this case I believe a true one. But it is rather a precarious basis for a book with the following chapter headings: " The Serial Drama of History, By the Author of——?, Synopsis of Previous Instalments, What Happened in the Last Chapter, Brief Outline of the Characters, Begin Here." I make no comment.

Much of Miss Sayers's interpretation of history is derived from two very good books, *The End of Economic Man* and Fr Demant's *The Religious Prospect*. These are excellent sources which needed popularization, and in putting her pieces together, Miss Sayers uses her real talent for the construction of a plot or of an argument, and sometimes lights on connexions which have not often been observed. Her strength is in construction; she significantly compares the creation of a work of art to the assembly of a complicated machine. Her weakness is in the texture of thought, emotion, and expression. Her enthusiasms are unrestrained. She writes that " the chapters on Skill, Labour, and Leisure " in Dr L. P. Jacks's *The Art of Living Together* should " be written with letters of gold on the tables of the heart." She sees an embryo Federal Union in the medieval Papacy and Empire, and the equality of all men in the medieval conception of distributive justice. She admires Professor John Macmurray, Mr J. B. Priestley, *and* the Surrealists, *and The Family Reunion*.

She wants her readers to be critical of this book, and of other books, but she might have been much more critical in the selection and presentation of her own sources.

George Every, S.S.M.

A Preface to Metaphysics. By Jacques Maritain. Sheed and Ward. 6s.

This is a translation of " Sept leçons sur l'être et les premiers principes de la raison speculative," which appeared in 1936. Though it seems to occupy a position in the promised " Elements of Philosophy " series intermediate between *An Introduction to Philosophy* and the projected treatise on Metaphysics, it stands in its own right as worthy of warm commendation to many classes of reader. The comparative newcomer to St Thomas, and of these there is an increasing number, is often perplexed by the basic assumptions which underlie his philosophy. He wants to see them clearly stated and justified, for a philosophical education which begins with Descartes renders St Thomas virtually unintelligible. M. Maritain has performed this difficult task of extricating these first principles, and exhibiting the primary intuition of being, with such lucidity that the most convinced " Unrealist " can hardly remain unaware of what Thomist metaphysics is really about. The more experienced, though still humble, student of philosophy, will realize the importance of what is said in the Third Lecture about the " metaphysical habitus," the characteristic mode of intellectual apprehension or eidetic visualization, which is requisite for the intuition of *ens in quantum ens*. M. Maritain's fine perception of the difficulties with which this highest act of the human intellect is beset, makes him an admirable preceptor. Though I am not qualified to pass judgment on his reliability, I may at least point out this outstanding quality of the book, that it is *grundsätzlich*, so that one knows exactly where the author stands. The significance of his position over against other philosophies is clearly brought out, and in particular he has taken up the challenge of modern " existential " philosophies, such as that of Kierkegaard, whose understanding of the term in relation to the will rather than the intellect is a one-sided emphasis bringing confusion, where in St Thomas there is clarity.

The Third Lecture, on " The True Subject of Metaphysics," deals with the Intuition of Being as such, concrete approaches to this intuition, and confirmatory rational analysis. It is the focus of the third point worth making about the book as a whole—namely, that here is an answer to those who find ontology an arid and unworthy handmaid to theology. " Here we are at

the root, at last laid bare, of our entire intellectual life," something primordial, at once very simple and very rich. This intuition, we are told, is always a gift bestowed upon the intellect—or rather its metaphysical content, which covers the entire domain of intelligibility and reality—is a gift bestowed by an intuition which infinitely exceeds the experiences which may have led up to it. Here is language which must appeal to the theologian who takes seriously his creation in the Image of God. Is it possible that Brunner and Maritain may ultimately be saying the same things ?

The Second Lecture deals with Counterfeit Metaphysical Coin, the being of Logic, Science, and Dialectic. The Fourth Lecture reveals the surprising richness of that being which is the true subject of metaphysics. The last three lectures expound and relate the Principles of Identity, Sufficient Reason, Finality, and Causality. This restatement of elementary principles in the light of modern criticism is indispensable to those who are trying to apprehend the essence of Thomism whilst groping in the maze of modern thought. To such, the whole book is intensely relevant, portraying as it does the Philosophia Perennis realizing itself under the pressure of many " potential philosophies."

W. A. Whitehouse.

The Ordination of Women. By P. R. Smythe. Skeffington. 5s.

This book is the honest attempt of one who is himself in Anglican orders to state the full case regarding the admission of women to the priesthood. It is planned as follows. First, the ministry of women in the Old Testament is considered, then the attitude of Jesus to women and the teaching of St Paul about their function in the early Church. Next we deal with the prophetess, the widow, the virgin and the nun in the primitive Church, and then, having dismissed these as irrelevant, with the primitive deaconess and her medieval successors, the nun, the secular canoness and the female preacher. The rest of the book—that is to say, more than half of its 227 pages—treats of the revival of the deaconess order after the Reformation, first in Germany and America and then in England, and with the prospects of further development in the present. Seventy of these pages are devoted to the at times rather banal discussions of Convocation and the Lambeth Conference; and it is only after a consideration of the present unsatisfactory status of the deaconess in the English Church that the actual claim to priesthood is discussed, with a good deal of repetition and a complete inconclusiveness, in the final chapter. Though painstaking and not without historical

interest, the book is from first to last pedestrian, and the number of errors uncorrected in proof suggests that even the author found it a wearisome affair. For all its good intention, it gives one a sense of secondhandness and superficial scholarship: the two Hebrew words on p. 16, for instance, are both miswritten, and the statement on the next page that in the earlier view "Yahweh was the father of Israel *in the same sense* as Zeus was the father of gods and men" is as contrary to the truth of Semitic thought as the suggestion based upon it is crude—namely, that the restriction of the priesthood to men had no profounder basis than that Yahweh, as a male god, had to be served by His own sex; nor does the writer improve matters by telling us that in the Jewish colony at Elephantine the goddess Anath was apparently regarded as His consort! (See, *e.g.*, Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination*, p. 75, on the Semitic conception of the Divine Fatherhood.) The real weakness of the book goes, however, far deeper than this. The author says in his preface that a claim of vocation modestly expressed deserves more favourable attention than it has yet received; and to accord this attention is his express purpose in writing. But thereafter he shows little understanding either of vocation or of the Body of Christ in which it is received and exercised. Women, no less than men, he tells us, should have full scope for their religious gifts, and it is matter for regret that the salaries now offered to deaconesses are not such as to attract the highly educated. Is the Sacred Ministry a trap, then, that men must bait to catch the finest birds? Is the Church a man-made society, in which the sexes struggle for equality, as classes struggle in the secular state? God forbid. Mr Smythe ignores also the essentially reciprocal character of vocation itself. The Word of the Lord, of the Spirit who spake by the prophets, comes to the individual in truth, but the same Spirit says also to the prophets and teachers who lead and represent the Church, "Separate Me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them"; and no individual call is ratified save by such commission from the Church. The lives of such women as St Catherine, St Joan and St Teresa do indeed testify that, things being as they are in this fallen world, there must sometimes be a painful struggle before such recognition is obtained; but the fact remains that one of the surest proofs of the reality of any vocation is its power to convince others, and the women claimants to the priesthood have as yet produced no such outstanding and convincing figures. Nor is this all. What is it that appears in Scripture as the authentic effect of that Word of the Lord upon the soul that receives it? Isaiah and Jeremiah, so far from demanding scope for their powers, are overwhelmed with their own unworthiness and insufficiency; and Mary of Nazareth, blessed above all women, asks not for recognition of her equality with the other sex but simply that the word and will of God may be perfectly fulfilled. We do indeed appreciate the

generous desire for fair play which prompted the writing of this book, but we cannot think that much will be gained by it. Apart from the objections already raised, some of the author's criticisms of those with whom he disagrees are in bad taste, and nothing is ever gained by lack of charity. Moreover, there is in his book a basic failure to understand the true meaning of equality. " God created man in His own image . . . male and female created He them." The functions of the sexes overlap to some extent, but they do not coincide. They are meant to be complementary, to fill each other's gaps and make a whole; but they are not meant to be alternatives or take each other's place. Mr Smythe himself observes that in the Old Testament the ministry of women, though never priestly, was sometimes notably prophetic, and he urges that they could and should exercise more of this function at the present day. Here at any rate we cordially agree with him. Would that all the Lord's people were prophets, for prophecy springs from vision, and vision is exactly what the world needs and this book lacks.

A Member of C.S.M.V.

Man the Measure. An Essay on Humanism as Religion. By A. H. Dakin. Princeton University Press. (In England, by Milford.) 17s. 6d. net.

Above the portico of a modern technical institute is inscribed the sturdy motto " Facta Non Verba." Perhaps the author never appreciated the *fact* that the motto itself is made of *words*. Thus the inflation of a dominating scientific mythology can be punctured by a little analysis. But meanwhile the damage is done, the emotive suggestion has already issued, too late to be swallowed back, that facts alone are real. (The scientific method, says Professor Julian Huxley, " consists in demanding facts as the only basis for conclusions," and this is " the only method which in the long run will give satisfactory foundations for beliefs.") Well, vaporization is a fact. But the unconscious irritation of the empiricist with the man who starts talking about values is also a fact. Of the word itself impatience refuses a definition.

That this irritation of the empiricist has been inherited and never really outgrown by the humanist is the first theme of this racy and confident study. Mr Dakin (author of a book on von Hügel) analyses the heights and depths of humanism, theoretical and practical, philosophical and liturgical. The way materialism determines the humanists' responses even while they disown it as a metaphysic; the mental erosion effected by a naive confidence in psychology; the ultimate and unexamined acceptance of the supreme value of human personality simply as a matter

of faith—all these are almost pugnaciously demonstrated. Mr Dakin seldom hits below the belt; usually a straight left in the text is followed by a swift upper-cut from the footnote. Sometimes the footnotes and quotations become burdensome, a process of sub-letting (*e.g.*, a sentence from " Bergson, quoted by Walter Lipmann in *The Phantom Public*, which in turn is quoted by L. M. Birkhead, Little Blue Book . . ." p. 111, n.). Once he trips: " moral values . . . are as ontological as anything can be " (p. 206). Surely nothing can be, any more than a cow can be empirical. But generally the philosophical analysis is competent and witty, leading indirectly to a staunch vindication of theism.

Yet who are these humanists? The " Humanist Manifesto " was published in 1933. But few of the most distinguished exponents here discussed signed it. Indeed, Mr Dakin does not make the mistake of the publisher's blurb in considering Bertrand Russell or Julian Huxley " ardent disciples " of humanism. Anyway Bertrand Russell's reputation depends on *Principia Mathematica*, etc., not on ephemeral squibs like *A Free Man's Worship* (from which we might have been spared yet another quotation). Freud, too, will scarcely be remembered for *The Future of an Illusion*, and Mr Middleton Murry has found *Moses and Monotheism* patient of a Christian reading. Of the signatories of the Manifesto, Mr John Dewey's alone is a name to command wide respect, and he as a logician rather than as author of *A Common Faith*; Mr E. A. Burtt has written a capable book on the *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, yet he seems an uneasy member of the group; and though Mr R. M. Lovett is editor of *The New Republic*, that paper could publish in 1936 an article by a semi-marxist, Mr Kenneth Burke, reinforcing some of this book's argument by saying that " since science now enjoys prestige . . . we find advocates as different as Dr Dewey and a toothpaste firm recommending their products under the ægis of science " (p. 103, n.). If humanism, then, is not yet intellectually " bankrupt " (easy phrase) it seems at least heavily mortgaged. This is confirmed by the glimpse into popular liturgical humanism Mr Dakin gives us (he is worth reading for these gems alone). One gathers that as a religion it is bourgeois (the functions include " dinners, parties, and entertainments of the better sort "), bureaucratic (" There are few things more thrilling than committee meetings," says one enthusiast, " especially if the committees are large ones "), fluctuating in numbers (in Minneapolis, 1937, " 750 average attendance at Sunday morning meetings held in a theatre," in New York only 100), complacently exclusive and eclectically emotional (public worship means " fine music, common concentration on a high ideal, the hearing of . . . an inspiring address, and association with similarly minded people "). We smile and enjoy it with the comfortable feeling that " it can't

happen here." Yet something of it is here already, and it is by no means certain that wherever the "slope of liberalism" lands us in the end it will run us down non-stop past this medium stage of degeneracy. Here is not our ultimate doom, but if we would avoid our nearer fate let us ask for a cheaper English edition of this capital and not yet anachronistic inoculation.

W. R. Jarrett-Kerr.

God's Judgment on Europe. By A. R. Vidler. Longmans. 4s.

The word of prophecy is once more being uttered in the Church of God. This word of prophecy has found expression in different countries and in different theological traditions. It has been uttered by Dr Karl Barth and by His Holiness the Pope, by Dr Reinhold Niebuhr and by Mr Christopher Dawson. The same word of prophecy finds expression in this small but closely written book. Two sentences from this book sum up the burden of the prophecy:

> The present European crisis . . . is a decisive stage in the disintegration of a civilization which for generations, if not for centuries, has been proudly emancipating itself from the authority of the Christian tradition, and the war is one consequence of Europe's detachment from its foundations (p. 98). The meaning of the war is that it is God's judgment, declared in the history which He overrules, on the apostasy of Christendom (p. 73).

The first five chapters of this book are admirable as a theological statement of the situation. The last two chapters likewise contain much that is admirable. But not all that the prophets utter is prophecy. There are passages in the last two chapters which make one question whether the author has yet fully succeeded in freeing himself from the Liberalism and the Utopianism which in the early chapters he so severely and so rightly criticizes. Is some of the author's pessimism concerning a machine age as such, the pessimism of a disillusioned Utopian? Does the author succeed in maintaining the tension between the loyalty that the Christian owes to the divine order of the State with its use of coercion and its relative justice, and the loyalty that the Christian owes to the revealed order of the Kingdom of God? Does the author both condemn the State for not using coercion and condemn it for using coercion? Is Tolstoyan pacifism Christian, or is it Liberal and Utopian? The title of Chapter VI should surely not have been "What can England do?" with its suggestion that there is after all a possible human solution, but the question "Christian Totalitarianism or Remnant?" The author has put the case "The new State

will have to be Christian as a whole, if it is not to cease to be Christian altogether " (p. 62). But is it really impossible for a faithful Remnant to survive within a Totalitarian society ? What is happening within Russia and Germany ? Is the answer of 1 Kings xix. 18 still relevant ? Christian Totalitarianism has obvious attractions for the astute politician. There are signs that moves in this direction are being made. As the centre of the new Europe, the Vatican City might suggest itself as an alternative to Geneva. A Catholic Totalitarianism has been attempted in Austria. Is such a way anything but a political offer to the Church of " the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them "? Is God offering to the Church any alternative to becoming a Remnant and walking the way of the Cross ?

These criticisms are, however, criticisms of detail and of application. The main argument of the book is a very serious proclamation of the Word of God to us in our situation. That Word we have to hear—we, not only the clergy, but the man in the pew and the man who does not occupy the pew.

J. O. Cobham.

Rumanian Pilgrimage. By Margaret Loughborough. S.P.C.K. 4s.

Holy Moscow. By Nicholas Arseniev. S.P.C.K. 4s. 6d.

Eusebius Matthopoulos. By Seraphim Papakosta. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

These three books published by the S.P.C.K. effectively undermine the deep-rooted conviction, still common to-day, that the contemporary Eastern Church is a venerable but lifeless relic of the past. Those who hold this view will be obliged to modify it considerably on reading these newly-published works.

The three authors belong to three different nations, and treat different problems, which they approach from entirely different angles. They all have one thing in common, however: they give a vivid picture of present-day conditions in the Eastern Church, and reveal the variety and vigour of its many manifestations.

Miss Loughborough describes her visit to Rumania in the autumn of 1938. She went there as a member of the Anglo-Orthodox Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, and her primary interest was to learn more about Church life in that little-known country. She has a real gift for description and is able to make her readers see the monasteries, convents, bishops' palaces, church schools, and other institutions which she herself visited. The life, so different from that of England, the customs and outlook, so unlike those of this country, are convincingly and sometimes critically portrayed by the author, who thus helps

us to gain a better understanding of the mentality of modern Rumanians. The book is illustrated with charming sketches of Rumania's churches and people by the Rev. J. Perret.

Professor N. Arseniev writes about Moscow, that great centre of Russian religious life before the Revolution. His style is impressionist; he gives a picture of Moscow as he sees it which is full of colour and personal touches. He treats that strange city with a genuine religious fervour. The book is composed in fragmentary style. It contains biographies of some of the outstanding men who were born and bred in Moscow; bishops, priests, lay theologians, writers and poets, prophets and saints, all appear in its pages; the atmosphere of the Church Service is described, and liturgical prayers are quoted.

This book gives a striking impression of the vigour and originality of that culture which animated Moscow society during the years preceding the Revolution. Russia at that time was gradually recovering from the cultural break caused by the enforced Europeanization of the country during Peter the Great's reign (1699-1725). Moscow led the way towards a new synthesis of Ancient Russian culture and Western European civilization. Professor Arseniev's book provides valuable and authentic information for those who want to understand better the past and future of Russia.

The third book is in some ways the most interesting, and yet is the least accessible to the average reader. It is a biography of the Rev. Eusebius Matthopoulos, who was probably the most outstanding Christian leader of the Greek Church since her liberation from the Turkish yoke. He died in 1929, leaving behind him a society called "Zoe," which carries on the preaching and teaching work to which he dedicated his life.

There are many people in this country who think that the Eastern Christians are singularly deprived of missionary zeal, and that they make very little use of the Bible. It will be difficult to hold this point of view after having read the biography of Fr Eusebius. If one tried to find a character in English history most resembling this great Teacher of the Greek people, one would undoubtedly pick on John Wesley. Fr Eusebius, like Wesley, spent all his life travelling; he went round the towns and villages of his country, preaching day and night to eager listeners the words of eternal truth emanating from the Bible. He preached the Word of God pure and simple, and this made him the greatest figure in the Church of his nation. He also suffered from calumnies and persecution, but, unlike Wesley, he remained an obedient member of his Church, patiently bearing the ecclesiastical punishments inflicted upon him by his episcopal opponents. Fr Eusebius is a fascinating figure, but his biography is written by a Greek, for Greeks, and in a style which was popular in this country a hundred years ago. That is why this most interesting book may appear unattractive to an English

reader. Those who have patience to wade through its old-fashioned style will be amply rewarded, for they will discover the inspiring personality of a great Christian preacher and devout priest, who consecrated his whole life in service to his Church and people.

NICOLAS ZERNOV.

SUFFERING HUMAN AND DIVINE. By H. Wheeler Robinson. Student Christian Movement. 6s.

The most urgent and ultimately the most unanswerable of all the questions that confront the human mind and heart has produced, and no doubt will continue to produce, books that are numberless but nearly always *little*. It is as though the writers, conscious of the inadequacy of any answer they can give, were unwilling to seem to be attempting an answer that might be adequate.

Dr Wheeler Robinson has indicated in his title both the limits of his subject and the direction of his solution. As he says: "The problem of suffering can be as slippery as an eel if we do not decide just which part of it we mean to grasp and hold firmly." He reminds us that "current and typical explanations" are "relevant only on the particular level"—biological, psychological, social, ethical, religious—to which they belong. The tendency of religious thought has been to link the fact of suffering too exclusively with the very different fact of sin. Man's misuse of his moral freedom is accountable indeed for much, but not nearly for all, of the suffering of mankind. We can recognize that just as this freedom, with all the evil to which it opens the door, is a condition of the highest good, so the regularity of natural law, without which thought itself would be impossible, and the dynamic movement of nature and civilization, involve exposure of the race to unavoidable and apparently unmerited evils. We can accept also the testimony of experience to the power in the individual to transform suffering by the spirit in which it is accepted. But no such reflections (so runs the author's argument) can reconcile us to the intolerable extent and pressure of human misery, unless we can believe that our suffering is shared by Him to whose will we ascribe our origin.

If we would have such comfort, we must face the difficulties which have made religious philosophy reluctant to admit the "passibility" of God. Dr Robinson is confident that these difficulties can be met; that suffering in God is self-limitation, not frustration; that the time-process in which we fear to "entangle" God is no illusion but the necessary form in which His gracious purpose fulfils itself; and that a love which *could* not suffer could have no power to draw. In the Cross we see "the actuality we call sin existent within God only as suffering";

and that suffering is redemptive, " objectively " atoning, because its voluntary acceptance transforms the consequences of man's sin into the occasion of God's grace. In this work of redemption, historically complete on Calvary yet constantly self-renewing, the Christian is called to share, and in so doing to learn that there is no other answer to his questionings but *Solvitur patiendo*.

Study of this " little " book—the close and repeated study which it demands and deserves—must, I think, impress any reader with the author's honesty and spiritual discernment. I should have welcomed a more precise determination of the true position which suffering ought for a Christian to occupy in the scale of evil. In fact, it is only the hedonist who can see in it the *summum malum*. For other philosophies, it may be a thing indifferent, or an illusion; for the Christian, it is a very bad thing—but it is not the worst; and there is a real danger that Christians may allow themselves to think that it is. I would also say that a Christian solution of the problem of suffering in God can be reached only by way of a true theology of the Incarnation. The defect of the Chalcedonian definition was that its primary concern was to maintain the divine impassibility. The Christology of Cyril was no more perfect than that of Nestorius or of Leo; but Cyril's thought—that in Christ God has " made His own " the suffering of humanity—is theologically more satisfying than any of its rivals, ancient or modern.

J. Burnaby.

Solitude and Society. By Nicolas Berdyaev. Centenary Press. 8s. 6d. net.

During the past twenty years we have had a multitude of books discussing the problems of community, and in particular the relation of the individual to society. Most of the books have been written from a sociological point of view, but there have also been a number written from a philosophical or theological standpoint. Among these is this book by Berdyaev, published rather more than a year ago. It is an illustration of the fact that once again the question of the nature of our knowledge of one another has been reopened in philosophy. It is not easy reading, and, as with most of Berdyaev's books, it leaves one with the feeling that his thought does not fit in too easily with the main stream of Western theology. Nevertheless it is worth a good deal of " pain in the mind," and it is lighted up from time to time by flashes of insight into human nature which are invaluable to those who are trying to understand their fellow-men at this time.

From a philosophic point of view its main contention is that our knowledge of our fellow-men, and still more our knowledge of God, is never a matter of mere inference. God can never

be a mere "object" of thought among other "objects"; He is not simply known, but is a Knower together with ourselves. This is true also of our fellow human beings. This immediacy in our knowledge of God has been denied vigorously by the greatest of our modern philosophical theologians—for example, Dr F. R. Tennant. Yet the denial has always been opposed vigorously by most of the great mystics, and certainly seems to have led philosophy and philosophic theology into a cul-de-sac. Here at any rate is a book which argues vigorously for a new approach to the question, and it can be read alongside Professor John Baillie's book *Our Knowledge of God*, and the book *I and Thou*, by Dr Martin Buber, the German Jewish leader.

A good instance of the psychological insight shown in the book is to be found in Berdyaev's analysis of the four types of relationship between the solitary Ego and the social environment. First there is the common type: man as a social animal, unaware of solitude. Secondly, the type of man who has no experience of solitude, but is indifferent to society, a type most prevalent in periods of comparative social stability. Thirdly there is the type of man who is conscious of solitude, but who has no social interests and is very little adapted to social life. Finally there is the prophetic type, conscious of both solitude and society.

There is a deeply interesting and surely autobiographic first chapter in the book, in which Berdyaev describes the philosopher as being essentially a tragic figure. Such he often is, but it is an exaggeration to describe him as a comic character, except perhaps to the unthinking.

H. A. Jones.

Christianity and the New Psychology. By W. B. Selbie. Centenary Press. 3s. 6d.

There are rigorists who deny the claim of psychology to be a science and the cautious layman may not unjustly ask its professors to compose their quarrels before they presume to dictate his beliefs. But there seems to be a wide agreement that, even if Freud's map of the New World of the unconscious may prove to be all wrong, he did at least get there, and we can no more ignore his discovery than we can Columbus', however little we may like some of the consequences. Dr Selbie admits that psycho-analysis is invaluable in diagnosis, and throws much light on moral pathology and "the origin and incidence of sin" (p. 84). But he concedes little more than this, and much of his discussion of the religious consciousness ignores the "new psychology," which means, in the main, psychoanalysis and its derivatives. (He wastes little time on the Behaviourists, of whom it has been said that they are living proofs of their own theory of the non-existence of mind.)

His main line of apologetic is to show the biological value of the Christian religion, and in a small space he says much that is useful and impressive, but his argument approaches the pragmatism which he criticizes in Jung. Moreover, the delusions of neurosis have some survival-value, and so have certain "fancy religions," whose adherents can appear offensively happy and prosperous. Dr Selbie makes the common criticism that psycho-analysts are over-concerned with abnormal and pathological subjects. He rightly remarks that they seem "hardly aware that there is such a thing as normal and healthy religious experience" (p. 35). But religion is likely to show pathological symptoms in an abnormal state of civilization, and at all times Christians have been subject to illusion, escapism, and self-projection. The self adopts a variety of shifts to escape the living God, and it is the great merit of the "new" psychology that it helps to pierce the many disguises of self-worship.

A sounder line of argument is to question the right of psychology to deny the reality of the objects of faith. Dr Selbie rightly says that it is only the subjective side of religion "that comes within the purview of psychology" (p. 124). The existence of God is as much outside its province as is the nature and reality of the physical world. But it is a pity that he could not have examined the three books (*Moses and Monotheism*, however, is too recent) in which Freud discussed religion, works remarkable for loose thinking, flimsy theorizing, and arbitrary treatment of evidence.

Some of Dr Selbie's phrasing lacks precision. It is not clear whether he regards man's animal nature as inherently evil (pp. 73 and 84) or morally neutral (p. 82). He forgets his own warning about the width of meaning Freud gives to the word "sex," but to say that "sex is essentially selfish" (p. 149) seems unduly to narrow it.

J. D. C. Pellow.

Philosophical and Literary Pieces. By S. Alexander, O.M. Edited with a memoir by his literary executor. Macmillan and Co. 15s.

All friends of philosophy and of Professor Alexander will be deeply grateful to Professor Laird both for his collection of Alexander's occasional papers and for his memoir. Those of us who were Alexander's young friends in his old age will find in the latter part of the memoir a discerning and sensitive picture of the Alexander we knew; in the earlier part we shall find a convincing account of the Alexander whom we suspected must have existed, and whom we should have loved to know. We think at once of the innumerable stories with which Alexander enriched Manchester and philosophical circles, and thank Professor Laird for preserving so goodly a collection of them.

He was the professor of legend, illustrating philosophical points by drawing diagrams on the soles of his boots, or cleaning the blackboard with his ancient raincoat. There is the story (of which it is only fair to say there exist what the Higher Critics would call " doublets ") of how he bicycled to Liverpool to give a lecture to a distinguished gathering with dress clothes underneath his cycling clothes and pyjamas underneath again. But all this was never a matter of mannerism, but of the completely unselfconscious absorption and spontaneity of a great child. He said in his speech on the occasion of the presentation of the Epstein bust, " Though I shall be glad if it is said of me, ' He was known for a certain gaiety of speech,' I prefer to have it said of me, ' He contrived for some years to persuade people that he could think.' For, my Lord, in spite of appearances to the contrary, I am really and truly and fundamentally a very serious man; it is only that I find it difficult to be dull." This combination of charm—sometimes an oddly provoking charm—with a deep underlying seriousness runs through these papers. Perhaps it holds the reader most in the literary pieces—or not " literary pieces " so much as glimpses into his intimacy with his lifelong companions, Dr Johnson, Jane Austen, Molière, Pascal. Of Pascal, he once said to the present reviewer, " He is so completely satisfying—so satisfying, but quite impossible." This review has not the time and space (or should we say, is not the Space-Time-Point-Instant ?) to discuss the large issues raised by Alexander's own religious philosophy. It is built upon the emotion of reverence—to Alexander, as to Otto, a persistent and infinitely significant feature in experience. This emotion is a physical as well as a mental feeling directed to a universe which is striving towards deity. " Emergent evolution " may well be a conception which raises as many questions as it solves, particularly in a world which, looked at empirically (and Alexander was an empiricist), looks, as Professor Laird remarks, as though it were going not to deity but to the devil. But Alexander's naturalism, tempered by reverence and " natural piety," produced a sensibility to growth, and an appreciation of the nature of constructive activity, particularly in the arts, which more orthodox and fashionable forms of theistic philosophy often sorely lack. The fundamental bent of his mind, religiously and philosophically, was Spinozist—he said he would be content if they wrote on his tombstone " Errarit cum Spinoza."

He was deeply interested in Whitehead's later work (a recurring *motif* in these papers). In a letter to the present reviewer he wrote, " I read Whitehead naturally not only to understand him but to save my own soul. I think of myself only as having done what Burke said he did for Johnson in conversation—' rung the bell for him.' But though Whitehead disregards Leibniz and proclaims his affinity to Spinoza, he is, as you say,

much more of a Leibnizian. And I believe I am much more of a Spinozist. And so there is a side to me which has to be either lost by obstinacy or saved by surrender to Whitehead (or of course the other way about)." We close these pieces with a feeling that the obstinacy held out; and since, had he surrendered either to Whitehead or to Pascal, he would not have been Alexander, we would not have had it otherwise. Sometimes, however, we wonder whether his charm enabled him to get away with views which were open to challenge—his minimizing of the significance of consciousness in his view of the connexion of psychic and neural processes, and his almost sociological interpretation of moral and æsthetic values, being cases in point. But his epitome was surely spoken in a letter from Dr Montefiore —"You are a dear, and quite unique. You do walk humbly with your funny God, and are so beautifully unconscious that you are *really* a great swell."

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

NOTE.—In alluding in a general fashion to the possible demise of *The Guardian*, among other periodicals, as a result of war, Mr Ashley Sampson in his article "Periodicals in Wartime" did not intend to imply that such a disaster was in any way likely. *The Guardian* is, in fact, very much alive and, even from the purely material standpoint, shows every sign of health and strength. It seems, indeed, lately to have entered upon its second youth.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ANGLICAN WAR-TIME GROUP: *Evacuation* (2d.).
BURNS OATES: P. F. Anson, *The Benedictines of Caldey* (7s. 6d.); Dom Anscar Vonier, *Sketches and Studies in Theology* (7s. 6d.); H. Belloc, *The Catholic and the War* (6d.); H. van Zeller, *Daniel* (7s. 6d.).
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: B. Colgrave, *Two Lives of Saint Cuthbert* (21s.); H. Loewe, "*Render unto Cæsar*" (6s.).
CENTENARY PRESS: N. Berdyaev, *Leontiev* (10s. 6d.).
C.L.A.: C. Simmonds and J. Castledine, *Teaching the Mass* (6d.); *Deliver us from Evil* (2d.); E. Underhill, *The Spiritual Life in War-Time* (2d.).
CLARENDON PRESS: R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay in Metaphysics* (18s.).
T. AND T. CLARK: T. W. Manson (Ed.), *A Companion to the Bible* (12s. 6d.).
JAMES CLARKE: Z. Maurina, *A Prophet of the Soul* (*Dostoievsky*) (6s.).
DACRE PRESS: E. L. Mascall, *Man : His Origin and Destiny* (1s.).
EPWORTH PRESS: E. S. Waterhouse, *The Christian and Modern Philosophy* (4d.).
FABER AND FABER: D. de Rougemont, *Passion and Society* (6s.); C. Chavasse, *The Bride of Christ* (8s. 6d.).
GOLLANCZ: Wal Hannington, *Ten Lean Years* (Left Book Club).
B. GRASSET (Paris): H. Ranty, *Les Orantes de l'Assomption* (21fr.).
MACMILLAN: W. Temple, *Thoughts in War-Time* (4s. 6d.).
MOWBRAY: E. Frost, *Christian Healing* (15s.); E. G. Selwyn, *The Epistle of Christian Courage* [1 Peter] (2s.); C. C. Keet, *The Psalms* (2s.).
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: J. E. L. Oulton, *The Credal Statements of St Patrick* (2s. 6d.); Z. N. Brooke, *Lay Investiture* (2s.); *Altar Services* (35s.); H. A. L. Fisher and others, *The Background and Issues of the War* (6s.).
PAX HOUSE: P. Maryon Wilson, *Caritas Christi* (1s. 6d.).
S.C.M. PRESS: N. Micklem, *The Creed of a Christian* (5s.).

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